The annual meeting of the North American Paul Tillich society was held in San Antonio, Texas, in conjunction with the AAR/SBL meeting on November 19, 20, and 21, 2004. In addition to the regular meeting of the Society all day Friday, three sessions were held at the AAR, two of the Tillich: Issues in Theology, Religion and Culture Group, and a joint session of the Tillich Group with the Arts, Literature, and Religion Section.

Professor Carl Vaught of Baylor University was the distinguished banquet speaker. The Society was especially honored to have Dr. Mutie Tillich Farris as its guest this year.

The following officers were elected for 2005:

President
Matthew Lon Weaver, University of Pittsburgh

President Elect
Terence O’Keeffe, University of Ulster

Vice President
Ron Stone, University of Pittsburgh

Secretary Treasurer
Frederick J. Parrella, Santa Clara University

Past President
John Thatamanil, Vanderbilt University

New members of the Board of Directors for a three-year term were also chosen:

Kelton Cobb, Hartford Seminary
Jean Richard, Association Paul Tillich
d'Expression Française
Darlene F. Weaver, Villanova University

The NAPTS is grateful for the dedicated service of John Thamanil, last year’s president, and Matthew Lon Weaver, President Elect and Program Chair this past year. The Society would also like to thank Duane Olson, McKendree College and Mary Ann Stenger, University of Louisville, for their service on the Board for the last three years.

Next year’s NAPTS meeting will take place in Philadelphia on Friday, November 18, and the AAR/SBL will meet November 19–22, 2005.

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In Memoriam: Langdon Brown Gilkey

Langdon Gilkey, pre-eminent scholar in the thought of Paul Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr, died on November 19, 2004 in Charlottesville, Virginia. He was born in Chicago on February 9, 1919, the son of the University of Chicago Chaplain. He earned his bachelor’s degree from Harvard in 1940 and his Ph.D. from Union Theological Seminary in 1954. He taught in the Divinity School of the University of Chicago from 1963 to 1989. After his retirement, he taught at Georgetown University and the University of Virginia.

As a tribute to Professor Gilkey, the editor has asked several of his contemporaries and persons who knew him well to comment on his life and work.

Langdon Brown Gilkey, Public Theologian, 1919-2004

The news of Langdon Gilkey’s death on November 19, 2004 awoke many rich memories of our friendship over half a century, and I welcome Fred Parrella’s invitation to write a personal reminiscence.

Langdon and I met as students in the Columbia University-Union Theological Seminary doctoral program immediately following World War II. We quickly found that we had radically different, yet strangely comparable life stories. He had spent much of the war interned by the Japanese army in China; I had been a combat soldier and then a prisoner of war of the Nazis. In our conversations as students, then later as professional colleagues, we learned each other’s stories in a helter-skelter sort of way.

Langdon was the son of Charles Gilkey, the eminent dean of the chapel at the University of Chicago. Like many minister’s sons, he considered himself very secular. As a Harvard student, he was troubled by the conflict between his near-pacifist convictions and his recognition of the threat of Nazism. At his father’s urging, he went to the university chapel to hear Reinhold Niebuhr, a visiting preacher. The sermon turned his world upside down. He later called the experience a “conversion.” Upon graduation from Harvard, he became a volunteer teacher of English in Yenching University, and subsequently was interned by the conquering Japanese army. Later he told that story in a fascinating book, Shantung Compound: The Story of Men and Women under Pressure (1966). I, too, grew up in a pastor’s family, also becoming a near-pacifist. But I was persuaded by events that military resistance to Nazism was an obligation. Like Langdon, I found Reinhold Niebuhr helping me sort out the issues. I told some of my story in Wars and Rumors of Wars (1972).

In the 1950s, Langdon and I found ourselves colleagues at the Vanderbilt Divinity School. He taught theology; I was moving from theology to social ethics. Vanderbilt was one of the only southern theological schools already desegregated. But the divinity school was the only school within the university to admit black students. Chancellor Harvie Branscomb assured us that he planned to desegregate the rest of the university one school at a time. Despite a few southern traditionalists, most of the university faculty favored action. There was resistance, however, from many students, most of the trustees, and most of the alumni. We tried to pressure the Chancellor to speed up the process of integration. We also supported the Highlander Folk School, the local American Association for the United Nations, the Fellowship of Southern Churchmen, the Union Seminary alumni/ae, and other interracial organizations. We were convinced enough of our mission that we both resisted invitations to join the faculties of other schools.

After five years at Vanderbilt, I returned to Union Theological Seminary. The next year (1959-60), Vanderbilt exploded. A black student, James Lawson, later a prominent Methodist bishop, was arrested at a sit-in at a local lunch counter. The University, not the Divinity School, suspended him. The
faculty of the Divinity School protested, with Langdon one of the leaders of the protest. In the conflict, they put their jobs on the line in a mass resignation. The University gave in to faculty demands and restored the faculty appointments. This episode, not mentioned in most of the recent press reports on Langdon’s life, was a formative event in his career. It confirmed and strengthened his commitment to a theology of involvement in the world.

In 1963, Langdon moved to the Divinity School of the University of Chicago and began his illustrious career of 25 years there. Upon retirement, he became a Visiting Professor at the University of Virginia. He is known, with some accuracy, as an interpreter of his two great teachers, Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich, and he wrote a book on each of them: Gilkey on Tillich (1990) and On Niebuhr (2001). But those two mentors were different enough that nobody could follow both of them without some disagreement. Furthermore, Langdon ventured into areas that neither of them gave major attention. He was a stringent critic of some of the clichés of the neo-orthodoxy that were common in his youth. He devoted his energy to dialogue among world religions, with a special interest in Buddhism, Sikhism, and the practice of yoga. He was far more interested than his mentors were in the relation of theology and science. In a series of books, too numerous to list here, he established his reputation as one of America’s notable theologians.

When arguments about evolution, once thought to be obsolete, erupted into political attention, Langdon achieved his widest public reputation. In 1981, the American Civil Liberties Union brought a lawsuit against the Arkansas requirement that public schools in their science courses give creationism a “parallel treatment” with evolution. Langdon was the obvious theologian to testify for the plaintiffs. His doctoral dissertation, later published under the title Maker of Heaven and Earth: The Christian Doctrine of Creation in the Light of Modern Knowledge (1959), though done under the guidance of Niebuhr, took up a subject that Niebuhr had never worked on extensively. Later Langdon published Religion and the Scientific Future (1970). So Langdon, who had some affinity with “New Age” styles, got a haircut, removed his ear-ring and beads, put on a necktie, and won national attention for his testimony in the trial. He argued that the biblical account of creation is not science and should not be taught in science courses in the schools. After the successful trial, he told the story of it in Creationism on Trial: Evolution and God at Little Rock (1985).

In these controversies, Langdon consistently made a double case: that religion and theology are not natural sciences, and they should not intrude on the methods and conclusions of the sciences. He affirmed that theology deals with a world of meaning that science is not competent to displace or evaluate. He was personally disappointed that the first of these propositions frequently got all the public attention to the neglect of the second.

To state Langdon’s belief is not to move it beyond controversy. A look at any issue of Science and Theology News (published by the John Templeton Foundation) or the publications of the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences at Berkeley is to see the diversity of opinions on the relationship between science and theology. However, those who differ with Langdon have a formidable antagonist.

Langdon’s heritage includes an impressive body of publications that continue to deserve attention. But this heritage is more than books and scholarly articles. Equally important is the impressive group of his students who carry on his work.

Roger L. Shinn
Reinhold Niebuhr Professor Emeritus
Union Theological Seminary

In the fall of 1949, I entered Union Theological Seminary as a member of the B.D. class. At the time, Henry P. Van Dusen was President, Reinhold Niebuhr was our super star with Paul Tillich in the ascendant. In his class on Christian Ethics, Niebuhr was the whirling dervish who started talking as he entered the class and never stopped even as the bell rang fifty minutes later. He quoted the Bible and the New York Times in equal measure and impressed upon us the relevance of one to the other. His brilliance and energy were so overwhelming that one had either to take down every word he said or listen and memorize. We students were therefore especially grateful for the arrival of Niebuhr’s T. A., Langdon Gilkey, a handsome, shy young man who had recently returned from the Second World War. Like so many others, he was still adjusting to civilian life, and moreover he was occasionally very de-
pressed. This condition was not unusual for returning soldiers who had had horrific experiences.

We students were grateful for Langdon’s careful and measured interpretations and elucidation of Niebuhr’s lectures. Moreover, Langdon understood Niebuhr’s thought from the inside. Langdon was always diffident about his own unusual talents; he never showed off, he was always accessible.

Langdon left Union for Vanderbilt University Divinity School where he flourished for a while. But when his marriage ended and there were difficulties at the school, he was casting around for a position in another university. Wilhelm Pauck who was at the University of Chicago, and a close friend of Langdon’s, the great preacher Charles Gilkey, encouraged Langdon to move to the Chicago Divinity School. This move turned out to be most productive for Langdon in his professional as well as in his personal life. He married happily for the second time. He became an unusually astute interpreter of both Niebuhr and Tillich’s thought. The last time I saw Langdon was at a Schleiermacher conference. He wore his hair long and straight, and Wilhelm Pauck teased him about the new look. “Langdon, you even look like Schleiermacher!” Pauck said. A wide smile crossed Langdon’s usual earnest visage.

It is a smile that I shall always remember. We shall all miss this gentle scholar and friend.

Marion H. Pauck

Langdon Gilkey’s Paul Tillich Lecture at Harvard

Editor’s Note: Langdon Gilkey delivered the Paul Tillich Lecture at Harvard University on 30 April 2002, entitled “Paul Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr on Theology of Culture.” The following is a brief reminiscence about Langdon Gilkey’s visit to Harvard.

In addition to his charismatic person and substantive lecture, Langdon Gilkey’s visit was especially memorable for other reasons. One was a luncheon I arranged at the Faculty Club with Langdon and two survivors of the Japanese prison at Shandung about which he wrote so unforgettable. They were Reverend Carl Scovel, minister emeritus at King’s Chapel in Boston (originally Anglican for George III, then Unitarian-Universalist), and his brother, editor of Long Island’s Newsday, who came up for the event. Sons of missionaires, they had become prisoners with their parents, whom Langdon vaguely remembered. Luncheon conversation and reminiscences made it a remarkable occasion; it was hosted by Dr. Richard Hunt, University Marshall.

There were other connections at Harvard for Langdon. His father, the Reverend Charles Gilkey, as Dean of Rockefeller Chapel at the University of Chicago, had been a prominent and influential voice in President Nathan Pusey’s reorganization of the Divinity School in 1954-1955. Further, since Langdon was a member of the Harvard College Class of 1940, I organized a table of four classmates and their wives for the dinner following his lecture. Among them was one of Harvard’s most honored faculty members, Professor Alfred Dupont Chandler, Isidor Straus Professor of Business History, emeritus, and a supporter of the Paul Tillich Lectures. A very distinguished classmate who attended the lecture was Robert Seamans, former Director of the NASA and Secretary of the Air Force for President Nixon, more recently dean of the faculty at MIT.

I was astonished to learn that this was the first time that Langdon was invited to lecture at Harvard. He was deeply moved by this visit and the events, so much so that at dinner he was quite unable to answer questions. The custom on these occasions is that the diners will have the opportunity of further questions and discussion. When I invited Langdon to the podium and the microphone, he arose, responded with a few words, then broke down and hastily returned to his seat weeping. I am much moved to recall his visit and this moment even now.

William Crout, Founder and Director
The Paul Tillich Lectures
Harvard University

Editor’s Note: Other reflections on Langdon Gilkey’s life and work are very welcome and will be published in subsequent issues of the Bulletin.
Confronting Paul Tillich: Being, God, and Categories

Carl G. Vaught

Editor’s Note: Professor Vaught delivered this address at the Annual Banquet of the North American Paul Tillich Society on 19 November 2004.

I.

In his essay entitled, “Two Types of Philosophy of Religion,” Tillich says that there are “two ways of approaching God, the way of overcoming estrangement and the way of meeting a stranger” (TT, 10). According to the first, we discover ourselves when we discover God, find something that is identical with us though it transcends us infinitely, and discover something from which we are estranged but from which we can never be separated (TT, 10). According to the second, our encounters with God are accidental, and we do not belong to each other essentially. In this second case, there is no certainty about the stranger we have met and “only probable statements can be made about his nature” (TT, 10). Tillich calls the first approach ontological and the second cosmological, identifying the first with Augustine and the second with Aquinas (TT, 10). Just as Kant argues in the First Critique, he believes that the first approach is more fundamental than the second, but he also believes that they have a positive relation to one another (TT, 10-11).

Both the ontological and the cosmological paths assume that God is the highest religious principle, and both assume that Being is the highest philosophical principle. This common presupposition leads to what Tillich calls “the problem of the two Absolutes” (TT, 12). In responding to this problem, he claims that the religious and the philosophical Absolutes (Deus et esse) “cannot be unconnected!” (TT, 12). Being could be subordinated to God, or God could be subordinated to Being, where in both cases, one of these terms would lose its absoluteness. Yet, when we say, “God is,” a positive connection between them is achieved (TT, 12). According to this view, Being and God are identical, and every other statement that we make about them should be regarded as a symbol that points beyond itself. This is true with respect to philosophical categories, (TT, 12) and it is also true with respect to Biblical personalism.4

Augustine gave an answer to the problem of the two ultimates by claiming that they coincide in the nature of Truth, where Truth is presupposed in every philosophical argument, and where Truth can be identified with God (TT, 12). Speaking from within the ontological tradition established by Augustine and sustained by Bonaventure and Anselm, Tillich says that since Truth is “presupposed in every philosophical question, including the question of God, God is the presupposition of God” (TT, 12-13). He also maintains that Being and God are known immediately and that the Absolute is affirmed “in every statement about the relation between subject and object” (TT, 13).

By contrast, Aquinas stands over against the ontological approach, (claiming) that “the rational way to God is not immediate, but mediated.” It depends upon inference, does not provide certainty, and must be completed by the way of authority. Thomas admits that the proposition “God is” is known by itself insofar as He is in himself, because the predicate is the same as the subject. But since we do not know about God, that proposition is not known by itself, but must be demonstrated through those things that are more known with respect to us, that is, through God’s effects. (TT, 16-17). In this way, Thomas excludes us from “the primum esse and the prima veritas” (TT, 17). These principles are no longer the uncreated light “through which we see” but “the created structure of our mind” (TT, 17); as a consequence, sapientia is transformed into scientia.

Tillich reminds us that Thomas “ascend(s) to God with the help of the category of causality” (TT, 18). Yet this does not imply that we can ever reach God as God is in himself. As Gilson formulates the point,

It is indeed incontestable that in God essence and existence are identical. But this is true of the existence in which God subsists eternally in Himself; not of the existence to which our finite mind can rise when, by demonstration, it establishes that God is (TT, 18).

Standing in contrast with these claims, Tillich asserts, “Man is immediately aware of something unconditional which is the prius of the separation and interaction of subject and object, theoretically as well as practically” (TT, 22). As a consequence, he claims that ontological awareness is more fundamental than inference (TT, 23). Tillich concludes his reflections about the primacy of God in the follow-
The power of being is the *prius* of everything that has being. It precedes all special contents logically and ontologically. It precedes every separation and makes every interaction possible, because it is the point of identity without which neither separation nor interaction can be thought (TT, 25).

At this stage of our discussion, I should mention two difficulties in what Tillich has said and has left unsaid about our relation to God. First, in speaking about the ontological approach, he maintains that even when we are estranged from God, there is something in him with which we are identical and from which we can never be separated completely (TT, 25). This use of the language of identity is dangerous because it implies that we are closer to God than we can ever be. Second, Tillich equates separation from God with fallenness rather than with finitude. In ST, 2: 67-68, he pays more attention to the meaning of *finis* that points toward death than toward limitation by negation. This fact implies that there are two senses of separation from God: the first is compatible with creation *ex nihilo*, where ontological separation points toward the difference between the creator and the creature. The second calls our attention to fallenness, where, in the language of 1 Corinthians, the “sting of death” that results from fallenness is sin.5

II.

In this second section of the paper, I turn my attention to Charles Hartshorne’s interpretation of Tillich’s doctrine of God and to Tillich’s brief response (K and B, 164-97, 339-40).5 The central issue in both contexts is whether the category of Being or the category of Process is the fundamental ontological conception (K and B, 169). Hartshorne argues that Process is the basic concept for two reasons: first, it subsumes rest and motion under itself (K and B, 169); second, rest and motion in this first sense are themselves in motion (K and B, 169). The category of Process plays two roles in Hartshorne’s metaphysical system. At a first–order level, it stands in contrast with the static dimension of Reality, which he equates with Tillich’s conception of Being (K and B, 169). At a second–order level, it is opposed to what is both static and dynamic, where the unity between them is in process (K and B, 169-70). It has seldom if ever been noticed that Hartshorne’s views are Aristotelian. Hartshorne claims that Being is an abstractible aspect of Process (K and B, 172), where the *telos* toward which Process is oriented brings unity to both the finite and the infinite beings that are subsumed under it.

When Hartshorne turns to the problem of God, he rejects Tillich’s view that Being and God are identical. As Hartshorne understands the problem, to identify Being and God would make them both abstract in every respect (K and B, 177). By contrast, he develops a bipolar view of God, where one pole is abstract and the other concrete (DR, 79-82; K and B, 185).7 The abstract side of God can be identified with a set of necessary truths to which the law of excluded middle applies, while the dynamic aspect of God is a cluster of contingent truths that characterize God because of his relation to contingent creatures (DR, 80; K and B, 180). The ontological argument for the existence of God pertains to his abstract dimension, and it pertains to the contingent side of God only to the extent that it is necessary that God has contingent characteristics (DR, 80; K and B, 181).

In his brief reply to Hartshorne, Tillich says, Being as the negation of possible non–being is the basic cognitive position which precedes in logical dignity every characterization of being. I am not disinclined to accept the process–character of being–itself. On the contrary, the idea of a living God seems to me to contradict the Aristotelian–Thomistic doctrine of God as actuality. But before this can be said, being *qua* being must have been posited. If I assert that potentiality as well as actuality is in God, I add that these are not separated in God as in finite beings. If this is true, the terms are not used in the sense in which they are created through experience, but they are used *analogically or symbolically* (my emphasis) (K and B, 339).

Tillich adds that, “Hartshorne agrees that God does not exist factually” (K and B, 339). However, if we continue to debate the question of the existence of God, his existence is affirmed or denied; and Tillich claims that in either case, what we say is blasphemous (K and B, 339).

In the quotation that appears in the previous paragraph, we find what might be called the “problem of the two Tillichs.” According to the first, Tillich asserts unequivocally that Being is the negation of possible nonbeing and precedes every characterization of being (ST, 1: 186). On the other hand, he embraces the process character of Being and seems
to move in the direction of Hartshorne (ST, 3: 228-45). However, Tillich makes it clear that his conception of the living God differs radically from Hartshorne’s insofar as potentiality and actuality are predicated of God symbolically rather than literally (K and B, 339). As a consequence, the problem of the “two Tillich’s” collapses.

Whereas Hartshorne believes that time contains eternity as an abstractible element, Tillich maintains that eternity is the unity of the temporal modes that are separated in empirical time. This means that time is both posited and negated as a category of finitude (K and B, 340). Yet, to negate the negative side “makes the positing side symbolic” (K and B, 340). Tillich does not know what the temporal modes are, but only knows that they are rooted “in the ground of being” (K and B, 340). Hartshorne believes that “contingency conditions God in some respect and makes him…finite in relation to it” (K and B, 340). Tillich’s resistance to this view derives from his overwhelming impression of “the divine majesty” (K and B, 340). This makes it impossible for him to accept any structural dependence of God on something contingent. To the contrary, Tillich embraces Luther’s symbolic statement that the “'naked absolute’ makes himself small for us in Christ” (K and B, 340).

When Tillich claims that what is static and what is dynamic are subsumable under Being, he stands in the ontological tradition as Augustine developed it. This thesis places him in opposition to the claim of Hartshorne that being and process are both in process. However, it also points to important differences among three concepts of nonbeing. According to Hartshorne’s version of the concept, nonbeing is always relative and calls our attention to the contrast between this and that. As a process unfolds, it opens out in stages that differ from one another only in a relative way (DR, 88). By contrast, Tillich is committed to the view that nonbeing is not only relative but also absolute, where nonbeing stands in contrast with Being (ST, 1: 188). Unlike Hartshorne, this relation permits Tillich to defend a doctrine of creation ex nihilo, where Being stands in contrast with the absolute Nihil (ST, 1: 188). It also permits him to correct his failure to distinguish finitude from fallenness and to embrace an Augustinian doctrine of sin as an attempt of a finite being to fall toward the absolute nonbeing from which it came.⁸

III.

In this final section of the paper, I will deal with the categories that Tillich uses to describe the nature of Being and God and develop an alternative to the position he proposes. Tillich’s categories are aspects of the two ultimates, and their relation to one another generates what might be called “a spiral of Being and God.” The conceptions in question are categories neither in the Aristotelian sense nor Transcendentals in the Medieval sense. Rather, they stand in between these levels and help us characterize Being and God in terms of the interplay among 

mystery, power, and structure.

The distinction between Being and God, on the one hand, and their structure, on the other, points to the mystery that all these concepts presuppose. Second, the structure of Being and God is not identical with mystery. Yet reflection on the mystery of Being and God confronts us with a dilemma. Either mystery is a determination, where the concepts of Being and God are partly intelligible in terms of it, or reference to mystery signifies fundamental indeterminacy in virtue of which we cannot establish an intelligible relation between the concepts in question. Yet both alternatives are unacceptable: To adopt the first is to surrender the partial intelligibility of Being and God, and to affirm the second is to render speech about them ineffective.

On the other hand, it does not follow that every kind of reference to mystery is to be precluded when one speaks about these concepts. Otherwise, we must regard them as determinate; and under these conditions, they lose their ultimacy. We are also unable to maintain the distinction between the determination of structure and the transcendent role of Being and God as ultimate realities that produce awe and wonder. It would seem that insight balances inadequacy and that this fact demands a different position.

If Being and God were both determinate and indeterminate, and if we regard them as a special kind of unity, a position might emerge that avoids the foregoing difficulties and incorporates the insights of both alternatives that ought to be preserved. As determinate, we could make intelligible references to God and Being. As indeterminate, we could include the mystery of both concepts. As dialectically determinate, intelligible speech would be possible and we could place them beside the mystery of radical indetermination.

In the following paragraphs, I will consider this
position as an attempt to combine structure with mystery. In the process, I will suggest that we can mediate the distinction between these conceptions by introducing the concept of power. I will then attempt to hold this triad of aspects together in the unity of a special kind of being. The position that I will consider purports to combine the intelligibility of structure with the mystery of indetermination, to mediate the distinction between mystery and structure by means of the concept of power, and to unify this triad of dimensions in terms of a special kind of being. From the standpoint of philosophy, this position represents a view of Being and God as dialectically determinate; and from the standpoint of religion, it involves the belief that God and Being have a Trinitarian structure.

Power must be included as an aspect of unity, since structure and mystery presuppose the concept of power as a precondition. Mystery and structure also possess the power of self-manifestation; and as Tillich understands so clearly, mystery appears as the aspect of Being and God to which awe and wonder are the appropriate responses. In addition, structure appears as the aspect of God and Being to which we respond intelligibly. In both instances, the self-manifestation of Being and God presupposes power.

In addition, mystery and structure presuppose the concept of power in the guise of what Tillich calls “the power to be” (ST, 1: 189). If structure and mystery are to manifest themselves, they must be and must possess the power to resist nonbeing (ST, 1: 189). As a consequence, we must not subordinate power to mystery and structure, for they presuppose it as an irreducible aspect of the meaning of Being and God. Finally, we must not only regard power as an aspect of Being and God but must also understand it as a term that mediates the distinction between the concepts of mystery and structure.

Power appears as the ground between the concepts in question, where their common reference to a single term binds them together. Power also provides a middle term between mystery and structure and is neither completely intelligible nor wholly indeterminate. On the one hand, power is not identical with structure; on the other hand, it is not mysterious altogether. It exhibits at least a minimal structure in the guise of duration and intensity, participates in both mystery and structure that stand in need of mediation, and provides them with a common ground, as well as with a common point of intersection.

The aspects of Being and God are interrelated as a series of mutual, self-referential presuppositions, and these interrelations provide us with the unity we seek. Structure presupposes itself as well as power and mystery, and power presupposes itself as well as mystery and power. Yet, we should also observe an asymmetry in Tillich’s conception of the mutual relations among the aspects of Being and God. He never suggests that mystery presupposes itself or that it presupposes the structure of being. Rather, mystery possesses the power of indeterminate existence.

If mystery is indeterminate, and if it fails to presuppose either itself or the structure of Being, it might seem that we cannot integrate it as an aspect of a larger whole. Mystery is irreducibly transcendent, and though it bears a positive relation to the other concepts, these relations are always asymmetrical. The circularity of the notions of Being and God is thereby called into question. Yet if the concepts of mystery, structure, and power fail to form a bounded whole, how can we speak about their unity? It would seem that what unity they have is only partial and that we must construe the concepts of Being and God as open-ended notions. The element of truth in this suggestion is that the concepts in question do not comprise a static, stable complex. Rather, their relation to one another is dialectical, and this dialectical relation prevents the unification of its aspects in a bounded whole.

However, the foregoing fact about this relation does not prevent a certain kind of unity. It does not prevent the kind of unity that we can find by analogy in every concrete being. This fact brings Tillich closer to Hartshorne than we might have suspected, and it suggests that we can regard the complex of terms before us as a special kind of being. Ordinary beings are unified with respect to the past and the present; and the unity they exhibit is dynamic and changing, since these beings face an open-ended future. The unity appropriate to beings is an accomplished fact only with reference to the past and the present, and unity with respect to the future represents a task that they must undertake anew in every changing situation.

By analogy, we can understand Being and God as a being, where the unity of their “past,” their “present,” and their “future” must be accomplished “repeatedly.” The relations between these concepts are logical rather than temporal, and the repeated “accomplishment” of their threefold unity is never problematic as in ordinary cases (K and B, 173).
This is because Being and God always have sufficient power to affect it. The presence of structure, power, and mystery as aspects of Being and God gives us access to their constitution, and it makes the truth of the thesis that they are a special kind of being possible.

1 I want to thank Christi Hemati, my graduate assistant in the Philosophy Department at Baylor University, and her husband Russ for their help in revising this paper and inserting the notes.

2 The notes for this article will be internal in the text. “Two Types of Philosophy of Religion,” Theology of Culture, edited by Robert C. Kimball (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), 10-29, (TT).


The admitted formative influence of Böhme and German mysticism on Tillich’s guiding theological perspective raises, then, the question of why Tillich was relatively silent on the work of Meister Eckhart whose experience precedes Böhme’s by more than two centuries and yet shares significant, if limited, common ground with Böhme. From his synopsis of Eckhart’s foundational positions in his A History of Christian Thought,6 and again in his very late discussion with the Buddhist scholar Hisamatsu Shin’ichi,7 Tillich displays a perhaps passing but nevertheless sympathetic and incisive knowledge of Eckhart’s experience and thought. His bypassing of Eckhart’s mysticism is of great interest in relation to Tillich’s sustained insistence on the necessity of moving beyond subject/object categories in an adequate experience and expression of the divine/human relationship.8 Eckhart, as well as Böhme, could serve Tillich in this concern because Eckhart’s mystical experience culminates in a state of identity with the divine in that apophatic moment of shared nothingness. In this moment all distinction between the divine and the human is dissolved and with it any possibility of relating to the divine as the Other or an Other over against the human subject.
The Mystical Defeat of the Subject/Object Split

Tillich insists throughout his work that conceiving of the divine/human relation within subject/object categories elicits atheism as the proper theological and spiritual response. This insistence brands his own theology as thoroughly atheistic in relation to all and every form of theism because theism cannot escape the subject/object split. Yet, Tillich leaves but tantalizing hints of what going beyond subject/object categories might entail ontologically and epistemologically. In spite of the religious and spiritual necessity of moving beyond the subject/object split, Tillich, in one instance, is driven to state that only revelation succeeds in plumbing the abyss preceding the split. “Revelation” in this context probably means an unmediated experience of the abyss itself. Mystical experience could thus give flesh to the consciousness or lack thereof necessitated by the journey beyond subject/object categories to that moment of identity with the divine that can alone defeat the alienation endemic to a conception of God as other than the human.

As suggested, this moment of identity is suggested by Tillich though rarely explicitly drawn out in its radical implications. His conception of the depth of reason establishes a dimension of reason where divinity and humanity coincide. It is from this point of coincidence that humanity and divinity depart into that distance that existential reason imposes on the knowing subject and object known. This distance and the alienation it entails are taken to its extreme in the conviction that God is somehow a Wholly Other and exceptional entity among the totality of entities. Without this point of coincidence in the depth of humanity, divinity’s only approach to humanity is from without. For Tillich, such a divine approach can only be heteronomous and so constitute the ultimate insult to the autonomy and dignity of the human mind and person. The depth of reason is no doubt closely related to that divine prior which precedes reason and whose recovery is, for Tillich, the basis of religion universally. This depth and this priority would also constitute the ontological ground of that panentheism that attaches to Tillich’s understanding of the native participation of the human in the divine. Tillich waited until the end of his third volume to explicitly acknowledge this panentheism, though it is present from the first volume as the power that enlivens his understanding of the divine/human relationship and without which his system remains unintelligible and soulless.

Tillich also engages the point of identity between the divine and the human in his understanding of the “principle of identity,” and its variant formulations, “the principle of immediacy,” and “the mutual within-each-otherness” of the “infinite within the finite.” All of these formulations refer to the point of coincidence in the human of the finite and infinite as the basis of the ineradicable possibility and necessity of human religious experience itself, and, so of the so-called “world religions.” Again, the point of coincidence between the divine and the human is dramatically on display when Tillich affirms that any authentic human knowledge of God is God’s knowledge of Godself working through the human. When he extends such intimacy to the spiritual world and to prayer he contends that all authentic prayer is likewise of God-to-God working through the human. In these positions, Tillich approaches, if he does not repeat, Eckhart’s famous affirmation that God and the human see each other through the same eye.

It would seem, then, that Tillich’s profound concern over the need to transcend the subject/object categorization of the divine/human relation is most thoroughly realized in mystical experience. This realization should move mystical experience to a more prominent place in his systematic thought than Tillich ordinarily gives to it. For, Tillich usually identifies mysticism as one of the two major iconoclastic responses to the idolatry inevitably generated when what he calls the “universal revelation...which becomes the presupposition of every concrete and particular revelation” does, in fact, concretize into its historical variants, of which Christianity is one. Mystical iconoclasm transcends idolatry by transcending any mediation, especially that of cleric or church, between the individual and the divine. In the German apophatic tradition, this transcendence takes on the force of a moment of identity with the divine beyond all differentiation. On the other hand, prophetic iconoclasm rests on the prophet’s critique, occasionally supported by critical, secular reason, of any pretension by that through which the holy appears to an unqualified identity with the holy itself. Tillich’s famous interplay of Protestant principle and Catholic substance rests largely on the prophetic denial that any expression of Catholic substance, the sacramental basis of religion itself, in-
cluding the religious figure of Jesus,\textsuperscript{25} can claim ultimacy in matters religious.

The problem of the relation of the iconoclastic response to concrete historical expressions of the “universal revelation,” especially in their theistic forms, reaches a certain crescendo in the closing pages of \textit{The Courage To Be} in Tillich’s delineation of the “God beyond the God of theism.”\textsuperscript{26} These pages contain Tillich’s most sustained rejection of theism in all its forms. First, he rejects popular theism’s ability to evoke a largely psychological sense of gravity and moral substance enabling “politicians” and “dictators” to use the term “God” to establish their moral credibility.\textsuperscript{27} (This kind of theism was blatantly exploited in the recent American election.) Second, theism can be used to describe the divine/human encounter within the subject/object scheme.\textsuperscript{28} Third, theism, in direct continuity with his second point, reduces the divine/human relation to the level of a relationship between two persons one of whom is divine. It is especially in his rejection of the theological inadequacy of religious and biblical personalism, in its usual and dubious form of an individual’s relationship to an individual God, that Tillich’s case against theism is most radical and drives to the God beyond the God of theism. Such a conception of God, though not less than personal, would corrode a relationship of the divine to the human reduced to that of one person to another.

Tillich argues, in these pages, that the God beyond the God of theism transcends both “...the mystical experience and the divine-human encounter.”\textsuperscript{29} One can easily see why such a God would transcend the personal encounter, in this case meaning the prophetic tradition, because prophetic consciousness is inescapably mired in subject/object categories. The prophet speaks on behalf of a God who is not the prophet, has approached the prophet from beyond, and, as an external agent, has mandated and empowered the prophet’s speech. In short, the prophet speaks for another and Tillich’s effort to free such speech from a theistic framework remains tortured and unconvincing. Ultimately the contention that the prophet escapes theism lies in Tillich’s identification of mystic with prophet as sharing in what he calls “absolute faith,” a faith derived from “being grasped by the power of being itself.”\textsuperscript{30} The content of such faith is the God above the God of theism. However, Tillich’s affirmation that absolute faith in the God beyond the God of theism transcends both mystical and prophetic experience remains highly suspect regarding prophecy because of the prophet’s undeniable relation to a divine Other. Tillich’s compulsion to extricate the prophet from the theism he rejects is probably grounded on his own admission that the prophetic lies at the heart of his cherished Protestant principle.\textsuperscript{31}

His God above the God of theism is less suspect in relation to mysticism. In Eckhart’s experience, and in certain moments of Böhme’s, there can be no doubt that both understood themselves to enjoy an instant of identity with the divine well beyond the God of theism. In the end, only the mystic and hardly the prophet can lay full claim to transcending the God of theism. If anything, prophecy should be located in the wake of the mystic’s experience and in the mystic’s consequent response to, and impact on, the surrounding civil and religious culture. Not infrequently, such prophetic impact has cost mystics their peace and, indeed, their lives. Tillich would like to contend that the winnowing experience of modern doubt and meaninglessness is “more radical than mysticism” because it dissolves even the ecclesial springboard from which the mystic departs.\textsuperscript{32} However, a closer examination of the cost in suffering undergone by the soul as it moves to Eckhart’s identity with the Godhead and undergone by Böhme in suffering the resolution of the divine self-contradiction in his humanity would, at least, lay this contention open to doubt.

\textbf{Eckhart in More Recent Scholarship}

To emphasize the radical nature of Eckhart’s experience, some of the scholarly development since Tillich’s time of dominant themes in Eckhart’s experience and theology need brief exposure before turning to Tillich’s own appropriation of Eckhart. A scholarly consensus seems currently to be forming around the reality of two dimensions of divine life based on the distinction Eckhart explicitly draws in his statements, “God and Godhead are as different as earth is from heaven,” and in variation, “God and Godhead are as different as active and inactive.”\textsuperscript{33} In this statement, God (\textit{Gottes}) refers to the trinity as creator. Eckhart describes the life of the Trinity as a \textit{bullitio}, a boiling, whose inner dynamic led to an \textit{ebullitio}, a boiling over into creation.\textsuperscript{34} This overflow has many consequences. It places necessity in creation because the Trinity could not resist its own drive to express itself beyond itself. It also affirms the eternity of the world, a point Eckhart makes in
his statements that in God’s speaking the one Word he hears two things.\(^{35}\) This means that the expressions of the Logos, within the Trinity and beyond the Trinity, are co-terminus, two dimensions of the same dynamic. It also means there was no situation in which the Logos remained unexpressed or creation uncreated. Further, the divine “overflowing” grounds Eckhart’s thought on the dialectical identity of creation and fall preceding Tillich’s own position by some six centuries.\(^ {36}\) In Eckhart’s imagery when he flowed out from God all things spoke of God but none were blest.\(^ {37}\) This was so because creation itself broke the identity of the creature with God by subjecting both to imprisonment in the subject/object split in which the creature stood in estrangement and alienation from a creator other than itself. In Tillich’s variation, creation occurs when the individual “steps out” of God by willing one’s existence and so one’s existential alienation from one’s source. As with Eckhart so with Tillich do “…creation and Fall coincide…”\(^ {38}\)

At this point, the second dimension of divine life enters into play. This dimension is the Godhead (\textit{Gottheit}) whom Eckhart clearly distinguishes from the Trinity (\textit{Gottes}). Just how Eckhart relates the Godhead to God as trinity is subject to variant treatments by Eckhart himself.\(^ {39}\) However, he is not affirming the simple emanation of the Trinity from the Godhead because the Godhead rests without any need for expression or activity beyond its own quiescence. The self-sufficient serenity of the Godhead plays the decisive role in freeing humanity from the alienation of relating to the creating Trinity as to another. The priority of the Godhead is evident in Eckhart’s prayer, “I pray to God to rid me of God.”\(^ {40}\) In this enigmatic prayer, he is praying to the Godhead to restore the identity he shared with it before the split into creature and creator. Eckhart here fills in the blanks Tillich leaves empty in what is involved in going beyond the subject/object structure. Only the recovery of a primordial moment of identity with the divine will suffice. Obviously, such a moment cannot be permanently held or it would quickly move into a catatonic state. But neither can it be wholly avoided if the God beyond the God of theism is to be attained and “the negation of the negation” of being other than God truly effected.\(^ {41}\)

Contemporary scholarship in Eckhart’s thought and that of other medieval mystics now embraces the distinction between a \textit{unitas indistinctionis}, a union of indistinction or identity, in contrast to a \textit{unitas spiritus}, a union sustaining a distinction between the divine and the human throughout the mystic’s relation to God.\(^ {42}\) Eckhart’s moment of identity with the Godhead, as well as that of certain contemporary Beguine mystics, is now clearly established as a \textit{unitas indistinctionis}, a union in which all distinction between mystic and Godhead evaporates into an all-encompassing nothingness.\(^ {43}\) This union of identity lies at the heart of Eckhart’s mysticism and constitutes at least a foundational moment in Böhme’s.

Contemporary scholarship also draws an important distinction between Eckhart’s experience of the birth of God in the soul (\textit{gottesgeburte}) and the experience of the “breakthrough” (\textit{durchbruch}). The experiences are no doubt related but are not identical.\(^ {44}\) In fact, the breakthrough would seem to go beyond the birth of God in the soul to the recovery of a lost identity with the Godhead. While the distinction of these two inner events cannot be denied, neither can they be put easily into a template or a sequential series in which one could be understood as preceding and inducing the other. What can be said with greater certitude is that the non-distinction between the divine and the human attaching to the breakthrough defies and defeats an understanding of any relation to God based on subject/object categories and so transcends all imagery including that of God’s birth in the soul.

The question then arises, “If Eckhart’s experience and theology as well as that of all apophatic mystics culminate in an identity with the God beyond God and so beyond the subject/object structure, why did Tillich not exploit Eckhart as a prime example of what such experience would mean and how it would be expressed?”\(^ {45}\) The answer here proposed is that Tillich’s commitment to orthodox Christianity’s trinitarian paradigm and its logocentrism forbid Tillich’s full appropriation of Eckhart’s experience of identity with the divine in the nothingness preceding all form and even tendency to form. Such experience implicates a number of theological consequences with which Tillich remained uneasy even in his attempts to delineate the nature of the God beyond the God of theism. The first is the moment of an unqualified identity of the divine with the human that Tillich, even with his powerful conception of humanity’s unmediated but inchoate intuition of the movements of trinitarian life,\(^ {45}\) reserved for a post-temporal situation. The second is the quaternitarian implication of Eckhart’s experience that could never reduce the Godhead to the nature or function of the
Trinity as creator. In his inquiry into the contemporary revitalization of the symbol of Trinity, Tillich toys with the idea of a quaternity but takes a non-committal stance to it. He himself may have realized and feared the power of a nothingness that not only precedes and births form and life but also can swallow it.

**Tillich’s Appropriation of Eckhart**

Tillich’s reticence in fully incorporating Eckhart into his theology may become more apparent through a cursory examination of the two major loci in his work where he refers to Eckhart. In his *A History of Christian Thought*, his treatment of Eckhart in the context of medieval German mysticism is incisive but does not explicitly address the key issue of the mystic’s moving to an identity with the divine. He does address the major themes of Eckhart’s distinction between God as ground and God as trinity, an indirect recognition of Eckhart’s quaternitarian divinity. He does refer to Eckhart’s position that the generation of the Logos within the divine life and beyond the divine life into creation are closely related but does not draw out Eckhart’s conclusion that these processions are identical and so confer on creation both its necessity and eternity. He does refer to Eckhart’s pantheism, so closely associated with his own, in terms of the divinity of the spark or scintilla in the soul of every human. In these passages, Tillich reveals that Eckhart’s natural felt presence of God as ground of the soul foreshadows the “eternal now” of his own theology and preaching. In continuity with such a conception of divine intimacy, Tillich accurately cites Eckhart to the effect that humanity’s natural divinity is the basis of the potential birth of God in the soul of everyone, a birth which relativizes the literal and historical birth of Jesus by Mary through extending such birth to humanity as a universal religious possibility and demand. In doing so, Tillich acknowledges Eckhart’s universalism based on humanity’s native divinity and the subordination of his Christology to the religious anthropology this universalism implies. Again in continuity with Tillich’s own theology, which would deny both the human possibility of atheism as an unattainable unconcern and the impossibility of a secularism divested of an ultimate cultural bonding value, Tillich rightly understands Eckhart simply to remove “...the difference between the sacred and the secular worlds.”

In some sense, Tillich does acknowledge Eckhart’s radical apophaticism. Tillich points to it through Eckhart’s use of the German word *entwenden*, an unbecoming or anti-becoming in a loss of self that could describe Eckhart’s breakthrough into the divine nothingness. However, Tillich does not use the term “breakthrough” in his treatment of Eckhart in his historical work and so mutes the note of total fusion of the human and the Godhead in the God beyond the Trinity as the ultimate resolution of the estrangement inextricably attached to the creature’s relation to God as other.

The reason for Tillich’s silence on this further reach of Eckhart’s experience becomes more evident in his 1957 Harvard dialogue with Hisamatsu Shin’ichi, a Zen monk and scholar. Early in the dialogue, Hisamatsu introduces the Zen idea of the “calm self” or “formless self.” Tillich admits that he would welcome this experience into his very busy life and asks the “how to” question, how to experience the formless self. In the following discussion, Tillich suggests that the formless self would lie beyond the subject/object scheme and his conversant agrees. But, when Tillich a second time asks how to get to this state, Hisamatsu himself introduces Eckhart’s experience of detachment and goes on to discuss Eckhart’s understanding of poverty. Eckhart’s is a rich and radical understanding of poverty that would divest the individual not only of excessive personal belongings, but also of intellect, will, and even of autonomous existence in the attainment of identity with the Godhead. Tillich acknowledges that such poverty does indeed empty the individual of “the subject-object duality.” It is obvious Hisamatsu is comfortable with the correlation of the Zen concept of the formless self with Eckhart’s *Ungrund*, as long and to the extent that, there remained no duality between the *Ungrund* and its concretion in everything finite.

Tillich can partially agree with this position but his qualifications about formlessness and his discomfit with the nothingness it implies come to the fore as the conversation continues. Such reservation had already been stated in preliminary form when Tillich insists that what can never be emptied from human interiority is the residual spark of the divine present there which he identifies with the logos. Hisamatsu agrees with Tillich that this residual spark could be understood as a potential for the awakening of the formless self. But, then, Tillich insists again that the actualization of this spark, which he closely...
relates to Eckhart’s understanding of the birth of God in the soul, must take the form of the birth of logos, in his own words, “the form in which the formless comes to form.” In this discussion, as throughout his theology, logos stands for the principle of form structuring the divine mind, the human mind and nature. Put succinctly, Tillich cannot abide formlessness or that nothingness beyond all need for expression in form and so wholly beyond the mind’s antinomies in that formlessness experienced by Zen, by Eckhart, and by Böhme.

Tillich’s inability to appreciate states of formlessness prior to and without a compulsive drive to form should not be surprising grounded as it is in his trinitarian theology. The abyss dimension of God, Böhme’s dark chaotic fire, has to express and complete itself in the Logos as the light and communicable moment in divine life. Only then can the antimony of dark and light be perfectly balanced in mutual completion by the Spirit within the Trinity as the precondition and possibility of their synthesis in created life. This perfectly balanced conception of divinity leads Tillich to reject the fourth and preceding moment in divine life. His theology and its attendant spirituality pay a steep price for this truncation. The absence of the preceding fourth makes it difficult for him to appreciate fully religious experience of the nothing divested of any need for its expression in form, as do some eastern traditions as well as the very apophatic western traditions on which his theology is, to some large extent, dependent.

In the context of Tillich’s efforts to delineate the God beyond the God of theism, his uneasiness with the formless strips him of a theological resource, which could identify a dimension of the divine beyond the Trinity free of the compulsion to form, both within and beyond its own life. No doubt, Tillich’s trinitarian theology is a powerful and compelling construct. It is rooted in the unmediated human experience of trinitarian life. However, if divinity’s preliminary moment, the abyss which craves form for its self-completion, would cede to a deeper abyss which does not, then the soul’s experience of rest in this abyss would provide relief from trinitarian urgencies and a certain realized blessedness in the here and now. Such rest would go beyond Tillich’s proffered fragmentary participation of human life in trinitarian life in time as contributing to the blessedness of the divine and human in eternity. The present momentary loss of distinction between human and divine in a preceding nothingness would thus provide the mystic with the deepest possible religious perspective and sensitivity in the reengagement with his or her religious and cultural environment consequent to identity with its source.

**Tillich, Eckhart, Böhme and the Double Quaternity**

Tillich’s trinitarian thought also impedes his fuller appropriation of Jacob Böhme’s experience. Böhme was also to enjoy a moment of identity with what he calls the “One” or the Ungrund beyond the living antimony of the Trinity as its “...cause and ground.” But as he returned to the grossness of the world from that unity that precedes Trinity, Böhme carried with him the sense that the conflicting divine opposites had not been overcome eternally within the divine life, as Tillich would have it with his balanced Trinity. In particular, the world of the Father as a dark chaotic and masculine power, the hell to which the fallen angels were confined, remained in residual conflict with the Logos, the power of warmth, light, and communication. Human consciousness then becomes the only agent in the universe that can first perceive and then resolve in history the self-contradiction divinity could not resolve in eternity. The meaning of history and of human suffering within history, then, becomes a process of mutual redemption and growth of both the divine and the human through the resolution of divine conflict in human consciousness at the insistence of divinity itself. This cosmology would again imply that divinity created human consciousness out of the necessities of its own unconsciousness as the only agency through which its own opposites could attain a redemptive harmony. With Böhme, the master experience of a divinity dependent on humanity for its own integration, which is at the same time humanity’s, cannot be denied. God as creator has an immense stake in humanity.

While Tillich is heavily dependent on Böhme for aspects of his trinitarian theology, he was throughout his earlier theology opposed to all real change in divinity as a consequence of its relation to humanity. His rejection of all forms of process theology was based on his conviction that a fated or conditioned God is not God. Böhme’s God is fated to achieve the resolution of its inner turmoil in the human and so depends on humanity’s success in working the accord of the divine opposites in history, an accord
that completes both history and divinity in one organic process. As a predecessor of Hegel, Böhme’s was a radical form of process theology. To Tillich’s credit, again in the final pages of his Systematic Theology, he introduces the idea of essentialization. In his understanding of essentialization, Tillich finally concedes to process theology and to Jacob Böhme that divinity is dependent on the human for its eternal wealth and blessedness. What becomes essential in time adds to the being and substance of divine and human blessedness beyond time. Indeed, “It [essentialization] is the content of divine blessedness.” In the very end Tillich concedes that if divinity had nothing to gain in time, the human enterprise would be “…a divine play of no essential concern for God.” In terms of the quaternitarian paradigm, Tillich finally acknowledges that Böhme completes Eckhart by making human interiority the locale in which divinity finds completion achieved in time and preserved in eternity.

This substantial alteration of his preceding theology is but one that the senior Tillich took to offset the Christian provincialism that he came to recognize and counter in his prior theology. His masterstroke in his late reversals was his effective denial of the Christians’ need to affirm a definitive realization of the kairos within history. This admission relativizes his Christology by making the Christ event a significant but not exhaustive or culminating realization of the essential in history. It also broadens the mandate of the Christian theologian to see in other religions and manifestations of the essential variations of what has occurred in one’s own. If Tillich’s thinking were to be continued in this liberalizing vein his appropriation of the quaternitarian thinking of Eckhart and Böhme would produce a vastly extended theology of the divine/human relation transcending the truncations of his trinitarian and logoscentric thought. Such an extension rests on the myth of a double quaternity. Eckhart’s furthest thrust into identity with the fourth in the God beyond the God of theism and Trinity would produce a compassion better enabling humanity to fulfill the role Böhme envisaged for it, namely, the fulfillment of itself and divinity through the resolution of divinity’s eternal self-contradiction in human history. In short, the double quaternity would relate a deeper ingression into the divine life to a more gracious ushering of divinity into historical incarnation in human consciousness universally. In a time when a fearful humanity now asks not how it will be saved through its religions but how it will be saved from them, such deepening and extending of the sense of the sacred would become a valued resource for a more graceful redemption of divinity in human history if it is to continue.

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4 Braaten, xxi.
5 Ibid., xxix.
10 Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 174.
11 Ibid., 80.
12 Cf. as typical, Ibid., 208.
17 Tillich, Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Christian Thought, 94.
18 Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume I, 172.
19 Ibid., 127.
20 Meister Eckhart, sermon, Qui audit me on Ecclesiastes, 24-30, cited by Andrew Weeks, German Mysticism.
from Hildegard of Bingen to Ludwig Wittgenstein (Albany: State University of New York, 1993), 86.

21 Tillich, “Christian and non-Christian Revelation”, *The Encounter of Religions and Quasi-Religions*, 64. Cf. also on universal revelation as the possibility of all revelation, Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, Volume I, 139.


27 Ibid., 182.

28 Ibid., 182-183.

29 Ibid., 177.

30 Ibid., 173-177-178.


32 Ibid., 178.


47 Ibid., 294.


49 Ibid., 203.

50 Tillich, “Two Types of Philosophy of Religion,” *Theology of Culture*, 27.


52 Ibid.


54 Ibid., 78-81.

55 Ibid., 78.

56 Ibid., 80, 81.

57 Ibid., 83.

58 This is the point in his sermon, “The Poor in Spirit,” fn. 36.


60 Ibid., 89.

61 Ibid., 86, 87.

62 Ibid., 88.


64 Ibid., 251.


67 Ibid., v.


73 Ibid., 422.

74 Ibid.
Jacob Böhme and Paul Tillich: A Reassessment of the Mystical Philosopher and Systematic Theologian

Daniel J. Peterson

No mystical thinker captured the attention of Paul Tillich more than Jacob Böhme, the post-Reformation speculative shoemaker whose insights Tillich once deemed “profound in comparison with much theism in modern theology.” Although Roy Morrison appears to exaggerate in his claim that if “Böhmist elements” were removed from Tillich’s perspective, his system would “evaporate,” it seems safe to affirm with John Dourley that “Tillich’s description of the dynamics of divine life owes much to Böhme.” That said, startlingly little has been written in the secondary literature specifically or extensively on the relationship between Tillich’s theology and what Andrew Weeks calls Böhme’s “philosophical mysticism.”

What has been written, moreover, generally fails to take into account what Cyril O’Regan identifies as the “orthodox reserves” present in the cobbler’s reflections—reserves that yield a detectable influence on the shoemaker’s doctrine of God.

As a corrective, the present essay provides a reassessment of the relation between Tillich and Böhme with respect to their understandings of divinity, emphasizing, especially in contrast to Dourley’s interpretation, a stronger current of orthodoxy in Böhme’s thought. This orthodoxy, I argue, surfaces specifically in Böhme’s presentation of a living God who achieves the goal of self-revelation and self-reconciliation through a dialectical process completed above time rather than within time. The fulfillment of a theogonic process above time, in turn, crucially unites Böhme with Tillich in an interpretation of ultimate reality that places both thinkers squarely against the Hegelian idea of a progressive “inner-worldly fulfillment” on the part of the Absolute Spirit in history. To understand why and how Böhme and Tillich resist an inner-worldly application of this otherwise eternal process, I begin with a survey of Böhme’s contemporary critics, move to an overview of the restraints against the above-mentioned heterodoxy in Böhme’s discourse itself, and conclude with a look at Tillich’s retrieval of the cobbler’s dynamic understanding of God as symbolically legitimate in the first volume of his Systematic Theology. The result of the analysis, it is hoped, will lead to a more balanced reading of Böhme as well as to a greater awareness of the role his philosophical mysticism played in the thought of one of his more devoted admirers, Paul Tillich.

The Charge of Böhme’s Critics: From Implication to Necessity

John Dourley is one of only a few scholars in the secondary literature to reflect systematically upon the relationship between Böhme and Tillich. Acknowledging the latter’s selective appropriation of contents from Böhme’s deep well of metaphors for the dynamic depths of divine life, Dourley claims that ultimately “the experience behind Böhme’s imagery may exceed the boundaries of Tillich’s theology and the orthodoxy in whose service it was performed.” Dourley substantiates his thesis by providing three conspicuous examples of Böhme’s heterodoxy: the necessity of evil in his doctrine of creation, the appearance of will before Trinitarian differentiation in his doctrine of God, and the role of the human person as the reconciler and indispensable mirror of God made explicitly for the purposes of divine self-revelation. While each of these have captured the attention of Böhme’s critics for centuries, the last in the series seems to mark for Dourley the pivotal and perhaps unbridgeable difference between the Post-Reformation speculative shoemaker and the modern German-American systematic theologian.

Dourley reads it, Tillich believes the conflict of opposites in divine life to be overcome in eternity whereas Böhme sees it as a struggle fought in history on the battlefield of human consciousness.

Dourley’s contention that humanity figures so prominently for Böhme in the unfolding of divine consciousness rightly begins with a brief series of
subtle caveats. Böhme’s imagery and experience, he says, pose “the more radical implication...that only in humanity could the resolution of divinity’s self-contradiction [between the forces of good and evil] take place.” Shortly thereafter, Dourley repeats in like fashion that Böhme offers the “prevailing suggestion that divinity is compelled to create to become self-conscious in its creation.” That Dourley (or any interpreter) would struggle to specify Böhme’s explicit position on the role of temporal creation and humanity in the theogonic process is surely understandable in light of the cobbler’s notoriously ambiguous style. The language of implication is accordingly appropriate; in Dourley’s analysis, however, it is also short-lived. Without further explanation, he moves from talk of the suggestion that temporal nature stands as the realm “in which all opposites including good and evil [are] ontologically present reflecting their divine origin and demanding reconciliation in the human” to the claim that this is the inevitable outcome of the cobbler’s thought. Humanity thereafter becomes indispensable for “redeeming divinity,” a position that would understandably contrast Böhme with Tillich’s controlled orthodoxy.

Next to Dourley, David Walsh exhibits the same inexplicable transition from the language of implication to that of necessity in Böhme’s thought. For Walsh, Böhme appears at the source of a trajectory in the modern period that fundamentally redefines history as “a dialectical process moving toward perfection in time.” Böhme, he says initially, provides the essential symbolic form necessary “for the later depiction of reality as a radically intramundane process.” This illustrates an appropriate distinction that mirrors Dourley’s similar reluctance at first to conflate what Böhme explicitly says with what his thought implies, suggests, or might eventually mean to his successors. Be this as it may, Walsh proceeds, like Dourley, to blur the distinction between supposedly implied tendencies and explicit content by positing the inevitability of a temporal application of the theogonic process not for subsequent interpreters of Böhme, but for Böhme himself. Thus, even though Böhme insists upon a “nontemporal form of becoming” to curb any inner-worldly interpretation of the theogonic process, the force of Böhme’s imagery apparently overtakes his orthodox intentions. Long before his modern successors would pull God down from the sky, plunk the unfolding of God into the telos of history, and then erase God entirely in favor of a seemingly synonymous secular mysticism of inner-worldly fulfillment, Böhme had basically committed the same feat, says Walsh, in his own writings.

The claim, then, that Böhme’s discourse necessarily leads to an application of an eternal process to history illustrates the primary shortcoming common to the analyses of Walsh and Dourley. Both read Böhme in spite of what he says, predicating the purportedly inevitable outcome of his imagery or experience upon what they initially regard as a mere implication or suggestion present in his writings. In so doing, each interpreter largely ignores constraints Böhme places on the theogonic development of God that restrict it to eternity, constraints that O’Regan more carefully identifies in his study on Böhme as belonging to a series of “orthodox reserves” woven throughout the admittedly confusing tapestry of the cobbler’s thought. As will now be shown, the presence of what Böhme calls eternal nature, the unnecessary creation of the temporal world, and the cobbler’s unique understanding of Christ’s death on the cross, all undercut the idea that the divine birth and unfolding achieves its resolution in time on the battlefield of human consciousness rather than above time amidst the angels in eternity. Böhme, in short, provides internal constraints that strongly resist a reduction of the theogonic process to a development in history.

**Böhme’s Constraints: Holding Back from History**

Böhme’s overall depiction of God consists of a narrative schema in which he characterizes the unfolding of divinity from its original, incipient, inchoate form as an ungrounded will toward manifestation to a God capable of self-reflexive knowledge, genuine freedom, and other-oriented love. H. L. Martensen, one of Böhme’s most devoted admirers in the 19th century, describes the motive underlying the process vividly with recourse to Böhme’s favorite image of the eye. “In connection with this [ungrounded] Will,” he observes, “Böhme also often speaks of a great, enormous Eye, in which all marvels, all shapes, colors, and figures lie concealed. But this eye sees nothing, because it only looks out into an undefined, illimitable infinity, where it meets no object.” With nothing else to see, nothing against which the outgoing vision of the eye can reflect, the eye also cannot see itself. Consequently, it requires a mirror or what Edward Beach defines as a
sensible medium or “experiencable” embodiment to see itself—that is, to become known to itself. The creation of an “other” emerges accordingly as a necessity for self-reflexive awareness.

Böhme’s conviction that “God had to become sensible to satisfy his [sic] need for self-revelation” illustrates thus the purpose behind creation; it also reveals the pivotal incorporation of a dialectical principle by which God comes into being and self-knowledge as well as the reason for why anything exists. As Beach explains, for Böhme “[t]he dialectical drive toward self-awareness within God’s originally inchoate will was what gave rise to the spiritual as well as the material universe.”

Beach’s sense, however, that material creation exists for the purposes of divine self-revelation does not provide a close enough reading of the role of eternal nature in Böhme’s theosophy, an oversight that reflects the same problem evident in Walsh and Dourley. This is the case for at least two reasons. First, though Böhme argues that, “God generated [the temporal creation], that he [sic] might be manifested by the material world,” he qualifies his observation by maintaining that manifestation in the temporal order benefits not God but angels and human beings so that they might “behold themselves, and set their imagination merely upon the heart of God.” The material universe exists, in other words, for its creatures, not its creator; it plays no necessary or indispensable role in the theogonic process.

A second interpretative obstacle to the idea that temporal creation is necessary for divine self-awareness appears in Böhme’s claim that eternal nature by itself is sufficiently capable of reflecting the light of God’s outgoing spirit back upon God. This is because eternal and temporal nature (paradise and the material universe respectively) serve the same function, “for before the Fiat, the third Principle [our world] was not manifested, but there was merely paradise in the place of this world.” Eternal nature already reflected the light or vision of God back to God before the creation of the temporal order, a function that Böhme describes as the “sport of love” or dialectic that exists between God and the angels who were generated out of the eternal nature for the purposes of divine self-knowledge. When Lucifer fell by his own free choice as one of many angels who were already reflecting the light of God back to its Source, the world as we know it came into being. Before the fall, eternal nature was entirely capable of providing divinity with the self-awareness it originally desired. The theogonic process, in short, achieved its goal above time without any need for temporal creation.

Böhme’s presentation of Lucifer’s fall brings into sharp relief the distinction in roles between temporal nature and eternal nature. Temporal nature, our world, emerges not as an inevitable step in divinity’s agonistic march toward self-reflexive knowledge. Instead, it appears as a result of Lucifer’s—and Adam’s—voluntary decision to turn in upon themselves and thus away from the light of God. Lucifer’s fall, in other words, reveals not a necessary chapter in the process of theogonic fulfillment and self-manifestation but a deterrent that God allows to take place, as Böhme says, so “that [God’s] will and purpose should stand; and therefore [God] would give to the place of this world and angelical host again, which should continue to stand for ever.”

God promises, of course, to redeem the material creation out of God’s good will, but God does not depend upon this creation for God’s redemption, reconciliation, or self-realization. The creation of the temporal order is thus not logically necessary but is simply de facto the case. Böhme’s belief that the creation of the material universe derives not from a need for self-awareness on the part of God but from a contingent choice Lucifer makes provides the best deterrent against any reading of the cobbler’s discourse that posits temporal nature as an unavoidable step in the theogonic narrative.

A final obstacle to the idea that temporal creation is necessary for divine self-awareness emerges in Böhme’s understanding of the cross of Christ. For Böhme, the cross has no necessary connection to the historical crucifixion at Golgotha. Rather, it serves an illustrative function insofar as it represents a metaphysical process that takes place in the heart of God above time on the plane of eternity, one where God “plunges down” into the darkness of self-craving created by contrariety only subsequently to be raised as the light and love of other-oriented freedom. Böhme vividly describes the process by observing that, when the first and second Principles of inward wrath and the outpouring love separate, “there it is that the flash maketh a cross, and upon the cross, the heart of God is generated [from eternity to eternity], and standeth as a heart in the body, or as the Father’s Word in his centre, and so maketh another centre in itself.” This moment in eternity, symbolically speaking, marks the point in the theogonic process where God truly becomes what
Luther would call the God for us of mercy and love. It also strengthens the position that Böhme resists an inner-worldly application of a development that completes itself above time since the historical crucifixion and the birth of Christ in the soul serve strictly to illustrate something that has already happened in eternity. Next to Böhme’s presentation of eternal nature and his understanding of Lucifer’s fall, the purely illustrative character of the cross plants the final pillar of support for an orthodox interpretation of Böhme with respect at least to the issue of theogony occurring above time.

**Tillich’s Appropriation: The Symbolic Applicability of Life to God**

Tillich cites Böhme explicitly throughout his major writings and published lectures in several contexts. First, in *A History of Christian Thought*, Tillich mentions Böhme by way of correcting what he thinks to be a common misconception among his students. “Many of you probably believe,” he remarks with pedagogical prowess, “that the unconscious is the discovery of Freud.” To the contrary, he says, the concept owes its origin to Böhme and Paracelsus who “already knew about the unconscious element in man [sic] and even applied it to both God and nature.” Tillich also mentions Böhme while discussing religious socialism and the creative, irrational ground of nature and history; in his treatment of ethics and the ontological meaning of power in *Love, Power and Justice*; in his analysis of non-being in *The Courage To Be*; and even in the context of existentialism and existentialist philosophy. The most important consideration of Böhme’s thought in Tillich’s work, however, appears in volume one of his Systematic Theology under the rubric, “The Actuality of God,” where Tillich mentions Böhme repeatedly in his remarks concerning the idea of God as being-itself.

In the section on “The Actuality of God,” Tillich treats respectively the topics of God as being, God as living, God as creating, and God as relating. God as being and God as living serve in particular as the most relevant in connection with Böhme, for in reverse order they illustrate nicely the problem to which Tillich believes Böhme along with Schelling, Schopenhauer, Brightman, Berdyaev, and Hartshorne are responding: namely, the evident lack of a dynamic component in what each thinker takes to be the longstanding or contextually prevailing descriptions of God or ultimate reality. Drawing upon the scholastic notion of *actus purus* as a conspicuous example, Tillich maintains that “[i]n this formula the dynamic side in the dynamics-form polarity is swallowed by the form side.” God becomes pure actuality. Only a dialectical balance of the polarities we experience in finitude can overcome the one-sided emphasis (in this case) upon form or stasis. This, Tillich claims, was what drove Böhme to posit his notion of God first as an ungrounded will toward manifestation.

From Tillich’s perspective, then, Böhme does a service for theological reflection by attempting to reintroduce a concept of God as somehow living. Unfortunately, this “solution” presents another difficulty. Since Tillich defines life as “the process in which potential being becomes actual being,” life as such cannot be applied directly or literally to God. God must transcend the separation of potentiality from actuality that defines and comprises life; otherwise, God would require redemption and reconciliation since such a distinction allows for the possibility of a disruption within God. Accordingly, Tillich posits “being-itself” as inclusive of dynamics and form without being reducible to either. “Being,” he writes, “comprises becoming and rest, becoming as an implication of dynamics and rest as an implication of form. If we say that God is being-itself, this includes both rest and becoming, both the static and dynamic elements.” God as being-itself, in other words, consists of a unity or grounding of the ontological elements, i.e., dynamics and form, which are disrupted under the conditions of existence. The divine conflict, to use imagery harkening back to Böhme, thereby achieves its resolution as a unity of opposites purely on the eternal plane. Humanity, in turn, looks back to a lost unity, longing in a somber chorus with the rest of creation for what Tillich, in one of his best sermons, calls a “lost good.”

Tillich’s conviction that divine unity occurs above time or that being eternally overcomes non-being, as he frequently says, marks the axis upon which his orthodoxy turns, an axis which separates him not from Böhme, but from Hegel as well as contemporary process thinkers. Citing the existentialists, Tillich rejects “Hegel’s basic error” in particular by contending that “[h]istory is not the divine self-manifestation but a series of unreconciled conflicts, threatening man [sic] with self-destruction.” History, in other words, is not a process of inner-worldly fulfillment where God works out God’s own
salvation or redemption in fear and trembling. As if to solidify his connection to Böhme, Tillich draws thereafter upon language profoundly reminiscent of shoemaker’s theogonic narrative by affirming that God “is the eternal process in which separation is posited and overcome by reunion.”\(^4\) The key to reading Böhme as well as other thinkers who rightly try “to prevent the dynamics in God from being transformed into pure actuality,” Tillich says, is to interpret their language symbolically and not reduce it to finite or temporal terms.\(^3\) The systematic theologian consequently stands as a thinker who takes Böhme seriously by acknowledging, as the cobbler does himself, that such language is “creaturely” and cannot literally or directly apply to God.\(^2\)

Tillich insists upon a symbolic reading of Böhme, then, for the same reason that “life” itself can only apply indirectly to the nature of God. A literal application of “life” to God would reduce God to a mere segment of reality subject to the same po-

larities of finitude. A symbolic reading of God in dynamic or vital terms, on the other hand, “includes a ‘not yet’ which is, however, always balanced by an ‘already’ within the divine life.”\(^4\) Dynamics and form on the plane of eternity stand together in a higher unity that Tillich identifies as being-itself. The temporal order as such does not participate or contribute to the fulfillment or reconciliation of polarities within the divine life. The same position appears in Böhme’s narrative, we recall, if one honors the cobbler’s restriction of the process to eternity by acknowledging both the previously mentioned con-

straints as well as the professedly symbolic or crea-

turely nature of his writings. This approach to Böhme prevents his vision of the development of divinity from seeping through the cracks of time and thereby making God somehow dependent upon the historical process where God is subject to the same polarities we experience as split and disrupted.

While other heterodoxies undoubtedly persist in the fields and valleys of Böhme’s discourse, commentators should be aware in this regard that—when read on his own terms—a strong case can be made for the cobbler’s orthodoxy with respect to the theogonic process. If granted, Böhme’s lively depiction of a completed process above time and Tillich’s understanding of being-itself as a balance resolved in eternity pairs together the two thinkers against the Hegelian idea of a progressive inner-worldly fulfill-

ment on the part of God or Absolute Spirit in his-

tory. God, for Tillich and Böhme, achieves self-

reconciliation through a dialectical process com-

pleted above time rather than within time.

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1 Paul Tillich, Foreword to Jacob Böhme: His Life and Thought by John Stoudt (New York: Seabury Press, 1957), 8. This is a rather significant claim, particularly given Böhme’s surprisingly humble origins. Born just under twenty-five years after the death of Martin Luther in 1575, Böhme was raised in the rural countryside outside of Gorlitz (now Poland) by a pious Lutheran family and given only a minimal elementary school education. He spent his childhood as a shepherd boy, but for reasons of poor health he became a shoemaker—a speculative shoemaker whose thoughts have influenced thinkers ranging from Milton and Schelling to Hegel and Tillich.


4 Andrew Weeks, Böhme: An Intellectual Biography of the Seventeenth-Century Philosopher and Mystic (Al-


5 Cyril O’Regan, Gnostic Apocalypse: Jacob Böhme’s Haunted Narrative (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 129.


8 Ibid., 429; italics mine.

9 Ibid., 432; italics mine.

10 Ibid., 435.

11 Ibid., 435.

12 David Walsh, The Mysticism of Innerworldly Ful-

fillment, 7.

13 Ibid., 15.

14 Walsh, in fact, admits that the notion of divinity’s self-realization and self-reconciliation as a development that occurs within time is “never completely explicated by Böhme,” an application that the shoemaker as a “true son of Reformation Pietism” neither desired nor foresaw (Ibid., 15).

15 Walsh observes, for example, that “[t]he sequential nature of [Böhme’s] description creates the unavoidable...
impression of a temporal process in which God generates himself through a successive series of steps’ (ibid., 82; italics mine).

16 Ibid., 82; italics original.

17 Though himself professedly unsympathetic to an orthodox reading of Böhme’s theosophy, O’Regan provides as a matter of intellectual honesty a catalog of Böhme’s orthodox reserves. Chief among these reserves is Böhme’s resistance to the divine achievement of self-awareness and reconciliation by means of human consciousness on the temporal plane, a resistance which O’Regan believes most sharply distinguishes Böhme’s orthodox intentions from those of his heterodox successors. He writes, “In contrast to Hegel, in Böhme the becoming of the divine seems to have been established prior to divine manifestation in Temporal Nature” (Gnostic Apocalypse: Jacob Böhme’s Haunted Narrative, 132). Nikolai Berdyaev observes likewise: “But the theogony [in Böhme’s thought] does not at all signify that God has a beginning, that He arises within time; it does not mean that He comes about to be within the world process, as with Fichte or Hegel; it signifies that the inner eternal life of God reveals itself as a dynamic process, as a tragedy within eternity, as a struggle with the darkness of non-being (Studies Concerning Jacob Böhme, 7).

18 H.L. Martensen, Jacob Böhme: His Life and Teaching, trans. T.Rhys Evans (London: Hodder and Staughton, 1885), 57. As Böhme himself remarks: “Nothing without contrariety can become manifest to itself; for if it has nothing to resist it, it gős continually of itself outwards, and returns not again into itself. But if it return not again into itself, as into that out of which it originally went, it knows nothing of its primal being” (Jacob Böhme, Six Theosophic Points, 167).


20 Ibid., 2.


22 Ibid., 72.

23 Ibid., 77.


26 Lucifer’s fall seems thus to approximate what Tillich identifies as the irrational “leap” from essence to existence in the second volume of his Systematic Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 44. This leap relieves God of culpability for sin and evil as Lucifer does in Böhme’s system, illustrating as well the fact that creation is not required for the completion of the theogonic process in either the thought of Tillich or Böhme.

27 Heinrich Bornkamm in Luther und Böhme (Bonn: Marcus und Weber, 1925) makes clear Böhme’s move away from Luther with respect to his interpretation of the cross as well as his concomitant rejection of the traditional doctrine of substitutionary atonement. As Bornkamm observes, “Es ist der Sieg über die Macht des Bösen und des Todes, nicht die Leistung des Opfers zur Tilgung der Menschheitsschuld” (200). Instead, Christ’s death on the cross is essentially illustrative of the rebirth (Wiedergeburt) which takes place in the soul as it moves from wrath to love, a rebirth which symbolizes the metaphysical process that takes place in eternity. “So,” Bornkamm remarks, “verbindet er die Forderung der Wiedergeburt fast immer mit der Errinerung an Tod und Auferstehung Christi” (199).

28 Jacob Böhme, The Threefold Life of Man, 131.


30 Ibid., 442.

On a heartbreakingly beautiful day in May 1963, a group of friends and colleagues celebrated my departure for west Europe on the France—at the time, the longest and loveliest ship on the high seas. The small company of guests included some faculty members at Union Theological Seminary, New York, and the senior vice president of the Oxford University Press, New York. We consumed champagne and little sandwiches in a state of high merriment, and then as suddenly as they had appeared my guests disembarked and I found myself standing at the high rail, waving farewell to them and to my beloved native city, New York. A chain of extraordinary events had brought me to this moment.

As one of the first women to serve as an editor of religious books in New York publishing circles, I had spent ten years working with scholars from all over the English-speaking world. Although the work was challenging and varied, I needed a change. My yearning for something new coincided with other professional offers including the most seductive of all: the New York Times was looking for a religion editor and my name appeared on the short list of four. As it turned out, the decision regarding the appointment of a new editor at the newspaper was postponed, and I passed over other offers from publishers in favor of scholarly research on the life and thought of my teacher and friend, Paul Tillich. In my personal life a double metamorphosis took place: a love affair transmuted into a friendship that has lasted a lifetime; simultaneously, a friendship was transformed into a new and lasting love. In every way, this moment of departure was for me, to use Tillich’s word, a kairos.

As I look back upon those exciting years I realize once again that Tillich’s belated fame, and the way in which he came to terms with it, became a special gift to me. Two events in particular were responsible for his extraordinary success beyond the academic world: the publication of his book The Courage to Be in 1952; and, of course, his appointment as University Professor at Harvard in 1955. Yet, even after Henry Luce published a cover story about him in Time, Tillich did not think of himself as “famous.” He liked to say, “If a New York taxi driver recognizes you, then only are you truly famous.” During his last ten years, he received more invitations to lecture than most men half his age could have accepted, he was earning more money than ever, and he had the deeper satisfaction of knowing that his thought was making a lasting impact and had a very good chance of surviving his death. The last was of greatest importance to him. He feared that after his death he and his thought would be forgotten. Yet, he often scoffed when one used the word “famous” about him.

I had studied with Tillich from 1949 to 1954, and our friendship began on a train between Boston and New York in 1952 while I was working for Reinhold Niebuhr, my other theological hero. Several older Tillich students, already professionally established, including my M.A. dissertation advisor John Dillenberger, Robert McAfee Brown and his wife Sydney, Mary Heilner, and my college major advisor, John E. Smith, the philosopher, became lifelong friends of mine. Each in his/her way were transmitters of an oral tradition at Union that in-
cluded many stories about faculty members, but none so fascinating as Tillich. In this group, John Dillenberger occupies a special place: for fifty-five years he and I have had continuous conversations about many scholars we have known, but most particularly we have talked about Tillich. All of us were in the same social circles and the receptions that invariably followed Tillich’s sermons or lectures brought us together again and again. Fortunately, an interesting mix of economists, political theorists, and psychiatrists, as well as theologians and philosophers, were usually in attendance. I remember with considerable amusement the time that Tillich told me to be wary of the Hungarian psychiatrists at a party that took place in a large apartment on Park Avenue. “Ze Hungarians,” he said in his pastoral role, “will try to lure you into another room. Don’t do it.” Five minutes later, a Hungarian psychiatrist sidled up to me and suggested we have our drinks in the next room. In those years in New York, the atmosphere at parties was highly stimulating both socially and intellectually, and flirtation was part of social sophistication.

Largely because of a suggestion made to me by Mary Heilner, a brilliant student of Tillich’s who worked for the church in Berlin after the war, and who died at the age of 37 of lung cancer, I had toyed with the idea of writing about Tillich long before he became really famous. When, therefore, during one of my not infrequent visits to Cambridge in 1960–61, Tillich began to express his feelings about “the phantom,” namely, the Paul Tillich about whom he read in the newspapers and journals—I was intrigued. He was made uneasy by the existence of that other Tillich, whom I have chosen to call “Tillich Beyond Tillich”—to be confused with the “God above God.” He also felt a deep sense of responsibility to that other Tillich, and this sense of obligation played a significant role in our discussions about his biography. Before we came to an agreement, however, we talked at great length, on several occasions, Tillich assuming an uncharacteristically distant, objective manner to which I had to adjust. His decision to help but not dictate to his biographer was made in all sobriety, and after discussion with his wife, Hannah and several colleagues, primarily with James Luther Adams and Wilhelm Pauck. These two gentlemen spent a number of hours with me, in Cambridge and New York, instructing and listening. When Tillich took the “leap of faith,” incidentally only after a contract was signed with the then Harper and Brothers, entrusting us with his biography, he held nothing back but gave us access to documents, especially letters not yet in the public domain. Moreover, he put himself at our disposal from 1960 until his death in 1965. It was an act of enormous generosity on his part for which I remain grateful.

I sailed to Western Europe on that brilliant day in May and spent four months interviewing members of Tillich’s family, friends, colleagues, and students. Not only were they a highly cultured group but they were extraordinarily generous to me, offering both time and knowledge. By the time I returned to New York, Tillich had heard from nearly every person I had interviewed in Germany and fortunately they had written with enthusiasm and approval. Tillich felt I had achieved a great diplomatic mission. This puzzled me because at the time I was not as aware as he was of the various alliances between some of the Tillichians and the enemy lines that had formed between competitors. Emanuel Hirsch, who refused to see me because of a bad experience with another American Tillich scholar who was indiscreet, was a notable loss to my work that both Pauck and Tillich lamented.

Tillich and I met for dinner a few weeks after my return from Germany, later driving to my flat on 79th street on the east side. Tillich, Freudian-Jungian that he was, removed his jacket and lay down upon a comfortable sofa in my living room, from time to time sipping Dewar’s scotch, listening to me read sections of the interviews, continually freely associating. The two of us decided that the best way to deal with the reports was of course to be “systematic,” meaning to work through them chronologically. And so I began to describe, from Walter Braune (my first interviewee in Berlin) through Lilly Pincus (my last interviewee in London) my encounters with the Germans. Tillich interrupted often, asking questions, sometimes agreeing, sometimes disagreeing, often enlarging upon what had been said. Reminiscing that evening proved to be a time of great joy for him and he held back nothing. He said it was an unheimlich or uncanny experience for him not only to see the photographs of family and friends that I had collected, but also to be with someone else who now suddenly knew more about him than he did himself. This evening, that the reserve he had briefly assumed when we were discussing the biography in earlier years fell completely away and never returned.
Too little has been written about Tillich’s ability to have fun. That evening Tillich listened as I read various portions of the reports, laughing like a child with pleasure and open-eyed wonder. I noted once again how fearfully objective he could be about himself. And once the personal side had been dealt with, as it were, we tried to formulate, at his intense request, a summary of the philosophical or professional “persona.” He was so intense because he needed to have a “story” to tell Hannah in order to assuage her suspicions. And so we composed a word picture of his professional side. Then, just before midnight, Tillich began to talk about himself and his relation to women, as well as his relation to Hannah.

Tillich said that extra-marital relations with women always presented a particular problem to theologians; he always entered each relationship with a great anxiety and deep feelings of guilt. He carried this guilt with him throughout his life. He felt it was too simple, where genuine love is concerned, to avoid a relationship with someone merely because the possibility of marriage did not exist. Nevertheless, he admitted it is a very different matter for a man and for a woman where an extra-marital relationship is concerned. For most women wish to have what Tillich called an “exclusive” (or marriage) relationship; whereas most men enjoy the ability to be polygamous. His guilt feelings, therefore, reflected that anxiety in many cases—where he had been emotionally, if not erotically, involved with a woman—that he prevented that woman from marrying and having children. For a woman not to marry and not to have children “is a tragedy,” Tillich said. On the other hand, Tillich felt that it is Unsinn (absurd) for two people who love one another to say goodbye just because they cannot marry one another. So long as the woman (should she be the single one in the relationship) permits herself to remain open to marital relationships—such a relationship or involvement is not tragic. Nevertheless, Tillich maintained, “Love is always tragic and marriage sad.”

These words were said by an old man who was very tired but in an unusually good frame of mind. He continued to reminisce, saying that he always repressed his past, never lived in the present, but always lived in the future. In this connection, he admitted that he had also repressed the memory of his sister, Johanna, and his mother because he loved them so deeply. Until he was seventeen years of age, that is to say, until her death, Tillich said to his mother, “I want to marry you.” He confirmed the notion that his sister Johanna understood him and his thought as no one else did but that he forgot her as quickly as possible after she died. I asked him whether he remembered anything more about his mother. A few facts were presented.

Tillich’s mother, although from the Rhineland, was austere (herb) and just as puritanical as his father had been. It was his mother’s father whom Tillich resembled: the bon vivant who loved wine and women. The photograph of Tillich’s mother that I had seen in Germany was that of a serious, intelligent, stern woman. Paulus noted that his sister, Elisabeth, whom I had interviewed, was aware of his “wild” side but she never talked about it.

Tillich said repeatedly that he could not have married any other woman except for Hannah. “She is a magnificent person, geistig bewegt, intellectually stimulating. And now she takes care of me as I need to be taken care of. No one understands her. I have lived with her for 30 years and only I understand her.” I recall in this context that Reinhold Niebuhr said precisely the same thing about his wife, Ursula, when talking with Wilhelm Pauck, but that is another story, and Niebuhr’s and Pauck’s views on women and marriage differed sharply from Tillich’s. Tillich added, “I expect something very different from marriage anyhow than most people do.”

Hans Jürgen Seeberger, Tillich’s nephew, also a psychoanalyst, whom I had interviewed for several days, was certain that when Tillich made the comment, “Das Dach ist nicht mehr da.” (“The roof is no longer there”) after his father’s death, that Tillich suddenly felt he was a free man. But Tillich maintained that Seeberger had not interpreted this comment correctly. “Das Dach,” he said is a roof, a protection. Parents represent a protection from death and when they are gone, the protection is gone. And so, upon his father’s death, Tillich felt not freer but more anxious. This is an example of the ironic fact that psychoanalysts, when they apply certain generalities universally, are sometimes wrong in their conclusions. Tillich was always disarmingly honest about himself in this case as well as in many others.

I asked Tillich about Heinrich Goesch, the psychoanalyst so often referred to as a charlatan, whom he and Hannah befriended in Dresden. Tillich said Goesch was not a charlatan but a “crazy, disorganized genius unable to produce.” Goesch lived with the Tillichs for a long time. The great thing that Goesch did for Tillich, he said, was to introduce him to “psychoanalytic living.” This was a step beyond
what his childhood friend Eckart von Sydow had done for him, namely, to introduce him to psycho-
analysis, he said, “after I returned as a barbarian from the war.”

Tillich maintained that he still loved Richard Wegener, the best friend of his youth with whom his first wife had an affair, despite that fact that Wegener destroyed his marriage with Greti. When I suggested that a photograph I had seen of Greti made her look beautiful, he said, “No, I never had the self confidence to think of marrying a beautiful woman.”

We talked then a little longer about his father. He said he had very positive, as well as negative experiences with his father with whom he sailed, played chess, walked, and talked. Tillich admitted that he played at being “helpless” (I had to unwrap a melba toast in cellophane at the dinner table), a sign of mere “laziness” on his part having absolutely nothing to do with a search for his mother, as some of the psychoanalysts I had interviewed maintained. We talked about my nightmares in Germany about the Nazis and the Gestapo knocking at the door, and he said he still had such nightmares especially when he is in Germany. He said that the horrors of which he dreams are “unimaginable.”

Tillich mentioned that he had met Bonhoeffer in Potsdam in 1933 but that this meeting was of no importance for him. “It was a very important for Bonhoeffer,” he said, but Tillich himself remembered nothing about the meeting. He expressed his willingness, later on, to recall a little bit about his relation to Troeltsch and von Harnack. His relation to Bultmann had positive and negative elements. The “myth” about his never having read anything was propagated by himself, he claimed. Tillich remembered that he had prophesied doom more than once during his last year in Germany, and said that his friends made too much of his remarks in Sassnitz and Kampen.

Tillich left my flat at precisely midnight. He insisted I take him downstairs to find a taxi. Over and over again he thanked me for all the work I had done for him and as I put him into the taxi, already waiting, he kissed me goodbye acolade, leapt inside, double checked with me on the name of his hotel (the Carlyle), and never looked back. He was already in the future.

I did not see Tillich again until March of 1964. At the time, he was still teaching at the University of Chicago. I continued to interview Tillich’s friends and colleagues in America, including primarily James Luther Adams, Wilhelm Pauck, and Reinhold Niebuhr. They stressed his enormous productivity, his genius, and his loyalty. The same man who was not faithful to his wife was always faithful to his friends. In March of 1964, he delivered a sermon titled “Life And Death” in James Chapel, at Union Theological Seminary. As always, the place was packed. Many of us noticed that morning that Tillich’s accent seemed unusually pronounced, and that he stopped reading completely every now and then. Long pauses occurred between sections of the sermon. We discovered later that he had two hours sleep the night before. He had lost his manuscript and had spent most of the night re-writing his sermon for Sunday’s delivery! During both the procession and recessional, Hannah, who sat in an aisle seat, paid particular attention to him—a wave of genuine warmth was visible, one to the other.

After the sermon, a mask of Tillich, sculpted by Tillich’s friend Brodsky, was presented to Union. Tillich sat listening to John Bennett, then president of Union, and Wilhelm Pauck of the same faculty, giving brief and warm-hearted eulogies. Bennett pointed out that although the universities of Harvard and Chicago might claim Tillich as theirs, he really belonged to Union where he had taught for 22 years and where he had become famous in this country. Pauck pointed out that when he and Tillich had visited Bar Harbor, Maine in the 1930’s, neither he nor Tillich suspected that a mask of Tillich might some day be presented to Union Seminary. We all laughed. He said that whereas Tillich had perched himself on top of a rock by the sea and immediately began to write, Pauck felt restless, and looked for a newspaper. More laughter. He also mentioned Tillich’s love of trees; Pauck had driven Tillich to the country one day to prove to him that there were forests in America. Pauck’s remarks brightened the dark March day and the somewhat somber mood of the ceremony.

A day later, Tillich came to my apartment where we had a very long interview. I had prepared several pages of questions, listing them chronologically. Tillich’s memory about his early years returned vividly this time around. He remembered things that had happened when he was four years old, primarily he remembered his mother. He remembered the parish house in Starzeddel where he was born, and the beautiful garden outside the house, and the great park belonging to the Lord, Prince Schoeneich Caro-
lath. He remembered his sister Johanna playing in
the sand, and his own dark green velvet jacket. In
Schoenfliess, there were sailboats on the lake. His
father managed the rudder and Tillich the foresail.
He remembered the water, the waves, and the wind.
He remembered his mother, and that she forced him
and the whole family to walk every single day, a
German tradition. Tillich had many childhood
memories about playing with his sisters and sledding
in the snow in wintertime, and the first leaves com-
ing out in the spring, and watching the stork’s nest in
early summer. Tillich had an idyllic childhood ex-
cept for his daily Latin lesson that his father gave
after the afternoon nap when he was grouchy. Once
when Tillich returned home late from sailing on the
lake in summer time, his father was so angry he
spanked him but Tillich felt physical punishment in
this case was justified. Tillich loved especially his
maternal grandfather who was a bon vivant who
loved women. His friend Eckart von Sydow ex-
plained Darwin to Tillich. One day he said, “You
know we are all descendants of monkeys!” Tillich
said it was a terrible shock to hear this. One sensed
the dreaming innocence of those years as he spoke
about them. Such memories came to him as scenes
in Impressionist and Expressionist paintings he
loved so much.

Each time I interviewed Tillich I would see
Pauck a few days later. Tillich liked the idea very
much that Pauck was so interested in the work I was
doing. He said that Pauck’s presence gave him a
feeling of security. Pauck was, to be sure, one of
Tillich’s closest personal friends. Moreover, Pauck
was a sharp observer of persons as well as a histori-
cal theologian whose wide range and sovereignty
over relevant details always impressed Tillich.
Pauck and I had dinner from time to time and some-
times attended the ballet or the theater. I recall one
evening when thing weren’t going so well in my pri-
ivate life asking whether he would be willing to take
me to the movies after we dined out. I said I had
never seen Greta Garbo in “Camille.” He said it was a very
good sport about it because he had seen the film
when it first came out in the 1930’s and it wasn’t
one of Hollywood’s greatest achievements. Robert
Taylor was almost too beautiful as a young man and
didn’t act very well but Garbo was perfect.

In the fall of 1963, after my return from Ger-
many, I had shared the interviews with Pauck to re-
fect upon. He was reluctant at first because of his
crowded schedule but he relented. A week or so later
he telephoned saying, “You robber, you! You robber!” I said, “What do you mean by robber?” He
said. “I started reading your interviews and I
couldn’t stop reading and I had very little sleep—
you robbed me of my sleep.” Pauck was hooked. He
became more and more interested in my work and
provided excellent questions for me to ask Tillich. It
so happened that by July 1964 Pauck and I had
fallen in love and although we kept this a secret, Til-
lich’s great intuition told him that something was
going on. Tillich was uncanny in this respect: he
always knew who was involved with whom even
before he was told. He carefully avoided saying any-
thing to either of us—following the unwritten rule
not to disturb love in its early stages.

On 10 July 1964, Tillich and I met at the Roose-
velt Hotel. He was frail and terribly thin. There were
150,000 Shriners in town and wherever we were,
there they were—drunken and noisy. We crossed
Grand Central Station in the direction of Janssen’s,
one of Pauck’s favorite restaurants. As we walked
through the main terminal we both looked with de-
light at the Eastman Kodak photographs of Portu-
guese vessels against the skyline of New York dis-
played at the far end of the terminal. Tillich, who
looked like an aging lion, was glad to see such
beauty. Tillich wore an elegant new suit, his silver
hair against the dark tan adding a leonine touch, and
he walked with a slow, shaky gait, but refused my
arm saying he was glad I didn’t treat him as though
he were an old invalid.

At Janssen’s we ate Schnitzel à la Holstein,
breaded veal cutlet with a fried egg and capers on
top. Tillich expressed his growing concern that I
didn’t have a full time job—he felt responsible for
that. I told him not to worry; I would find a new job
in the fall, little knowing that I would be married by
then. Later we went to his hotel room where the
question and answer period began. He sat in a
straight chair, like a good child, and answered all the
questions one by one. As Pauck later said, “Marion,
he really came through. I am pleased and I congratu-
late you.”

This interview was very long but I have tried to
distill the relevant parts for you. Tillich talked about
his experience in the Wingolf fraternity and his
friendship with Frede Fritz and Hermann Schafft.
Schafft, he said, was his pater in pneumati. There
was an erotic element in the Wingolf friendships that
did not include homosexuality. Tillich, incidentally,
was very open about homosexuality or gays and les-
bians. In the Wingolf fraternity, Tillich had learned a decisive thing for his theology: one cannot demand of a member of any religious group that he accept the creed for himself personally. One can only accept the fact that each member is willing to live in the community that has this creed, e.g., the Christian creed. This is exactly what he told his students of theology late in life. He talked of Kähler and Medicus and that moment of destiny he described in several autobiographies, namely, when he passed a used bookstore, saw Schelling’s Gesammelte Werke in the window, and immediately purchased them.

Tillich said that he regarded the First World War as the Wendepunkt of his life. The main impact of the war upon him was the destruction of classical idealism. Eventually he developed feelings for religious socialism, but through the war he was fundamentally, phenomenologically, and critically transformed. He experienced cultural pessimism towards the western world. He played chess during the war and lived in a “strange” world. He experienced abysmal horror of brutality and death. He lived with these horrors every day and this experience naturally changed him. After the war was over, he transferred his Habilitation from Halle to Berlin where he lived and taught.

Tillich lived in an apartment in the Friedenau-strasse in Berlin, an apartment dubbed the Kastastroph-Diele or the Hall of Catastrophes: an abortion, the departure of his wife Grethi, a robbery, and the birth of a baby. His early trysts with Hannah Werner—and these were not catastrophes—also took place in that apartment. Although we were not able to quote from letters written by Tillich to Hannah that reveal the ecstatic, beautiful story of their first meetings and their courtship, sections of our biography depend not only on Tillich’s spoken words but also on these letters.

Tillich also talked about his year in Marburg, and stressed that he was not a close friend of Heidegger’s but only a distant colleague, trying to make his mark. Tillich, however, visited Heidegger from time to time after the Second World War and enjoyed private discussions with him. While in Marburg, on the other hand, Tillich befriended Rudolf Otto whom he loved. They discussed the ecstatic. On the whole, however, Tillich felt that Marburg was dull and provincial. In Dresden, Tillich met Expressionist painters in a fully artistic atmosphere. His book The Religious Situation had been published and had made an impact. Therefore, he had felt up to the new challenge in Dresden.

Finally, in Frankfurt, Tillich became a full professor. He said he was utterly surprised when the Nazis dismissed him. He couldn’t believe such things were happening in Germany, although paradoxically he had predicted the destruction to come on several occasions. He and all his friends, however, thought Hitler could not last. He accepted the invitation to teach at Union Seminary in New York because it enabled him to earn money and keep afloat but he was certain that he would return to Germany. Life in Frankfurt in those years was almost as exciting as it had been in Berlin. Moreover, Tillich was very much in demand by the time he reached Frankfurt. He was invited to give new courses and he was relieved he could give courses in philosophy and not in theology. He had the feeling sometimes he was not completely up to teaching philosophy but did so anyhow.

The geographical surroundings of Frankfurt were very beautiful: the Taunus, the Rhine and Maine rivers; the villages, the theater in Darmstadt, only half an hour away by car. Tillich saw Berg’s Wozzeck premiere. Tillich belonged to several salons one of which was run by Kurt Riezler. Riezler’s wife was the daughter of the painter Max Liebermann. Paul and Gaby Oppenheim, two wealthy patrons, also had a salon. And the Directors of I. G. Farben had one but they supported Hitler with their money, said Tillich in a bitter tone I had not heard before. According to Tillich, such salons represented the highest form of social activity—“not a cocktail party with superficial chatter, nor a separation of men and women, but a meaningful, intellectual social exchange, Gesellschaft, or society.”

Frankfurt’s art galleries and museums, but also many costume balls, delighted Tillich everlastingly. How often did he say, “I so miss going to costume balls in this puritan country. And my special wish would be for you to come dressed as Madam Pompadour to one.” When I reported this to Pauck he was not amused. “You are much too nice to be a Mme. Pompadour!” I replied, “Oh, I did not take his remarks negatively. After all, I am not in love with him, I am in love with you!” “But Tillich is your hero or you would not be working so hard to write about him,” he said chuckling. When I repeated this jovial exchange to Tillich, he laughed and said, “Of course, Wilhelm is right. I am your hero or you wouldn’t be doing all this work for me. I thought to
myself, “I am not working for you alone. I am also working for myself!” It was now my turn to assume some distance and objectivity. At Christmas time that year, Tillich sent me a message written on the back of a color photograph of himself and his grandson, Ted. Tillich wrote:

“Liebe Marion! Paulus as grandpa wishes you the best possible Christmas. The blessing of the old ones is effective, and I give it to you for all you have done for me and of which the stones in Europe are singing. P.”

During the summer of 1933, after staying at Sassnitz auf Ruegen and Spiekeroog, Hamburg, Tillich bade farewell to his family in Berlin. He could not however recall his final meeting with his father and suggested that I ask his sister, Elisabeth, about pertinent details. Pauck thought, and quite rightly, that it was very strange that Tillich did not recall such an important meeting.

Tillich felt that his move to America was a catastrophe in every way but that it turned out to be beneficial in every way. He had to learn English late in life. He again had to teach theology. He had to go to chapel every day whether he liked it or not. He would never have become a Protestant theologian had he remained in Germany, he said. He would have remained a provincial German professor in terms of language, subjectively, in every imaginable way. He had the mistaken notion, as some German professors most unfortunately still have today, that there was nothing new in America. When he came to America, however, he realized how wrong such a notion was. The community at Union to be sure was narrow and close knit. In Frankfurt, he had been a complete individual, while here he met the same people in the elevator every day. In Frankfurt, he had been secular. At Union, he received his “divine education.”

Tillich said that there was, of course, an unconscious effect upon his systematic theology in America. He introduced the element of existential thinking into his system in America. The question and answer method, or the method of correlation, was something he thought up in America. This can mean, he said, that he discovered the method here, or it can mean that he was ready to discover it by the time he reached these shores. He was not certain. Although there was no theology in America, Tillich said there was empirical theology, logic, both of which were religiously impossible. But there was something else. There was the human attitude, the churches, the idea of community, the democratic spirit, the feeling that the individual is important. The treatment of refugees by the Americans, said Tillich, is a great witness to the United States. For the first fifteen years of his time in America, he was not called upon to do anything demanding so he spent time in East Hampton working on his Systematic Theology. The gift of time and new concepts arising from the wide horizons of America transformed his work.

Tillich never became involved in politics in America because he didn’t really understand American politics. But there was a more compelling reason, namely, the fact that Reinhold Niebuhr, who understood American politics from the inside, was the voice of American mainline Protestantism and democratic liberalism at the time. Eventually, therefore, Tillich replaced his interest in politics with an interest in depth psychology. Tillich was convinced that in America social problems were more easily solved, or at least addressed, than individual problems, and so he became interested in individual ethics and depth psychology. His friendships with Karen Horney and with his student and friend, Rollo May, were important. Tillich’s sermons were profoundly influenced by depth psychology; Rollo May’s work in the field of psychology was profoundly influenced by Tillich’s thought. The poet W. H. Auden wrote a long poem called “The Age of Anxiety,” partly influenced by Tillich’s theology, and vice versa. Tillich thus became known well beyond theological and philosophical circles.

Tillich’s years at Harvard as University Professor were greater, he said, than even his years at Frankfurt. For by then he was known all over the world. He traveled all over the world. His trip to Japan represented an extremely important experience for him, he said. It was the first opening up of Asia, still strange to him. It was the greatest widening of his horizon since his arrival in America.

Our interview had once again lasted until midnight when Tillich suddenly became the grand, old, nostalgic man. One of his greatest experiences in America, he said, was his friendships with couples. Everywhere Tillich had gone to speak, he was met by couples connected with Union or Columbia whom he had met when they were young. He was received by them as an old friend. The greatest encouragement he received throughout the years came from these couples. It is, he exclaimed, the best thing in this country: pupils and friends. Tillich had
friends everywhere; this made him profoundly happy.

Later that summer, when Pauck visited the Tillichs in East Hampton, it was clear to them that he had changed dramatically from the mournful widower (his wife, Olga, had died in January 1963) to his normally witty, cheerful, teasing self. They were very happy to see this transformation in their old friend but discreetly refrained from asking direct questions. But when Wilhelm and I sent postcards to Paulus from one of our outings to West Point, Jones Beach, and even Nova Scotia, Paulus knew immediately that something important had happened. From the beginning, he was enormously excited about this event but he was also ambivalent. Accordingly, he was exceedingly curious to know the details. When the Tillichs and Wilhelm attended Arthur Miller’s After the Fall in the late summer of 1964, Hannah suggested that Paulus and Wilhelm have a drink together after the play was over. She returned meanwhile to their hotel. Paulus wanted to know how Wilhelm had managed to persuade me to marry him. He said, “I told her stories. She likes stories. I make her laugh!” Paulus asked many other questions, as a good pastor should. “Kannst du mit ihr Pferde stehlen?” “Ja!” affirmed Wilhelm. (“Can you do anything and everything with her?” Wilhelm said, “Yes.”) “Dann,” said Paulus, “ist alles o.k.” (“Then,” said Paulus, everything is o.k.”) After Tillich was satisfied by the results of his friendly inquisition, they called me up and said, “We are coming to see you.” It was again the midnight hour. We talked and laughed until two in the morning. Tillich made us promise never to tell Hannah that he had been with us in my apartment. We promised, and although she doubtless knew and suspected the truth, we never told her directly. In November 1964, Wilhelm Pauck and I were married and Tillich officiated at our wedding. ReinholdNiebuhr was best man. That was the last occasion when Niebuhr and Tillich were together privately or publicly. A few months later, when Tillich telephoned as he was passing through New York, he spoke to Wilhelm and asked, “Und wie geht’s euch?” (“Are you happy?”) Pauck replied, “Sehr.” (“Very happy.”) “..Und Marion?” (“..And Marion?”) “Sie ist auch glücklich.” (“She is happy, too.”) “Ach” said Tillich, “das ist selten.” (“Oh,” said Tillich, “that is rare.”)

We saw the Tillichs several times after that: at our home in New York, in Chicago in their home, and then again in East Hampton in the summer of 1965. By then Tillich was very frail, standing under his favorite copper beach tree, his eyes fixed upon some distant place in some distant time. We spent three wonderful days there and on the last day, Hannah said the three of us should have lunch together without her since she had another appointment. We went to Gurney’s Inn, a well-known restaurant in Montauk. Tillich marched ahead with great assurance commandeering the best table available overlooking the sea. At lunch, he ordered two martinis saying he had become a drunkard. This was again a great exaggeration on his part. Tillich was a bit morose but became more cheerful when we talked about our work and started asking him questions once again. We proceeded slowly for his energies were clearly not as great as they had been even a few months earlier. We hoped there would be other meetings although I pointed out to Wilhelm that there was no need for him to bone up on Tillich’s theology, Tillich’s intellectual development, and its origins and history. After all, they had spent a lifetime discussing his work and their lives were deeply connected; the tragedy remains that no one taped their conversations.

In October 1965, Tillich died. For a long time we turned to other projects. Tillich’s death was a great personal loss to us both. Materials in the archives that I had already examined were not immediately available. Without Tillich’s presence, it was suddenly much more difficult to proceed. Hannah Tillich’s memoir and Rollo May’s laudatio, so different in tone and purpose, were equally helpful in freeing us to write about matters we could not have done otherwise.

I have sometimes wondered whether anyone needed to write a biography about Tillich. He said it so well in his several brief autobiographies. He simply tells the truth in is imaginative and objective way. It is because he was so complicated and many sided that he is seen in differing, seemingly contradictory ways by people who were and are themselves complicated and contradictory. Yet, the act of reviving him in my mind in order to write about him once again for a new generation has resurrected both the “phantom” and Tillich himself in an extraordinarily vivid way. How often have I sent Tillich out to sea for a final farewell. Yet, he continually finds a way to return to shore.

1 Jaroslav Pelikan and I had many productive discussions about a Tillich biography beginning in 1960, and we
even thought of being co-authors. As discussions proceeded, however, Tillich concluded that Pelikan’s conservative theological point of view and his increasingly crowded schedule at Yale University each presented major obstacles to his continued participation.

Tillich referred to several friends as his "best friend," Eckart von Sydow, Richard Wegener, Herman Schafft, Adolf Loewe, and Wilhelm Pauck, each playing major roles at different times of Tillich’s life.

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**Response to Marion Pauck’s “Tillich Beyond Tillich”**

**John Dillenberger**

As I listened to Marion read her text, I found myself laying aside the notes I had prepared for my response. It dawned on me that few knew the full range of her work on Tillich and that I should provide the wider context.

Marion had known Tillich since 1949, as student, friend, and helper. That she was completely bilingual made it easy for Tillich, and her professional publishing experience brought the expertise he needed. When Marion initially proposed doing the biography, Tillich was slow to react. But further conversations brought an unhesitating "yes," and with it, full access to documents. When Tillich found out that Pauck was supportive, indeed professionally and personally so, Tillich welcomed the proposed two-volume enterprise, in which Marion would take the major responsibility for the life and Wilhelm for the thought, each working with the other on final texts.

Marion has given us off-guard glimpses of Tillich, disclosures about life that could only come from trust, indeed, glimpses that provide more than Tillich knew was being revealed.

As Marion herself tells us, when the first volume was near completion, two publishing events happened that sped up the process of finishing the first volume. First, Hannah Tillich’s volume, *From Time to Time*, created a stir because of what she said about Tillich’s personal life. While what she said is undoubtedly true, I read this volume as primarily an account of herself rather than as an attack on Paulus. But Marion and Wilhelm needed to take the issue into account. The second publication was the slim volume by Rollo May, written without a critical eye, but replacing an extensive manuscript that he left in a taxi and never found again. Hence, the need for a biography was urgent.

When Wilhelm Pauck died, the second volume on Tillich was incomplete, but some sections done by Wilhelm were finished. Marion made the decision for the finished portion to be published, rather than trying to complete the proposed second volume.

Marion herself raised the question at the end of her talk about the need for a biography of Tillich since Tillich had already given us such revealing autobiographical sketches. But she also knew that there was so much more to say about this complex man, which she alone could provide. Most recently, she has given attention for the first time to Tillich’s view of himself, i.e., his ruminations about himself as a private person and as a public figure. Again, she has caught the nuances that Tillich himself saw and that he unwittingly disclosed.

Join me in thanking her for the passion and grace with which she continues to purvey the man and his work.
New Publications


Reimer, A. James and Werner Schüssler, eds. *Das Gebet als Grundakt des Glaubens: Philosophisch-theologische Überlegungen zum Gebetsverständnis Paul Tillichs*. Munich: LIT Verlag, 2004. (This volume contains both English and German essays.)


Book Notice

ROBISON B. JAMES

The editor wishes to thank Robison James for writing this book notice for the *Bulletin*.


In English, the title of this work might be rendered: “Religion as the Consciousness of Freedom: A Study of Tillich’s Conception of Theology as the Theory of the Conditions Required for the Constitution of Individual Subjectivity.”

The author is Professor of Systematic Theology, Lutheran, in the Protestant Theological Faculty of the University of Vienna. He is Vice-President and future President of the Deutsche-Paul-Tillich Gesellschaft and, despite his relative youth, one of the best equipped and most insightful Tillich scholars on the Continent. He has already edited and contributed to yet another volume, which I hope soon to review: *Theologie als Religionsphilosophie: Studien zu den problemgeschichtlichen und systematischen Voraussetzungen der Theologie Paul Tillichs* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2004). The present extremely important volume is a thorough reworking of Danz’s Habilitationsschrift at the University of Jena. It deserves a full review. What follows is the author’s abstract, which I have put into English.

In a study that won the German Paul Tillich Society’s “Paul Tillich Prize” in 2000, Christian Danz here presents the Tillichian theology as a whole. Setting out from the concept of freedom, he interprets Tillich’s theology as a theory concerning the structural conditions for the actualization of finite freedom. Danz begins with the observation that we cannot adequately grasp the idea of freedom unless we understand it as both the exercise and the determinateness of freedom. This idea of how the problem of freedom is to be understood is combined with a reformulation of the ontology that is significant for Tillich’s later work. Danz interprets that ontology as a theory concerning the structural conditions for the exercise, or the actualization, of finite freedom. Out of Danz’s proposed re-reading of Tillich texts arises a new vision of Tillich’s Christology and pneumatology. By including pneumatology within Tillich’s Christology, Prof. Danz reconstructs Tillich’s Christology as a theory as to how human beings can find meaning in history.

Not only pneumatology, but also the doctrine of God, is among the fundamental themes of Tillich’s theology that are explained in a systematic perspective, and given a new interpretation. The author orients the edifice of his investigation to Tillich’s magnum opus, the *Systematic Theology*, of course; but he also does a thorough job of bringing into the discussion both the larger body of Tillich’s writings, and the background history of work on the problems. Thus, Tillich’s doctrine of God is discussed against the background of the philosophical outlines of J. G. Fichte and F. W. J. Schelling, and Tillich’s idea of the symbol is profiled in dialogue with Ernst Cassirer’s *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*.

Offering a well-grounded rendering of the Tillichian theology, this book is driven by the conviction that Tillich’s theology, even under the different conditions in which we find ourselves today, has lost none of its analytical power to open up the subjects with which it deals.

For information, please contact: Prof. Dr. Christian Danz, Institut für Systematische Theologie, Evangelisch-Theologische Fakultät der Universität Wien, Rooseveltplatz 10, A-1090 Wien. christian.danz@univie.ac.at
Errata

The editor wishes to thank Marion H. Pauck for submitting the following corrections to her translation of *The Jewish Question: A Christian and a German Problem* in the Summer *Bulletin*, volume 30, number 3.

- Page 6, Column A, Line 36: “blue blood” should read “blue-blooded.”
- 11A, 3: “to” should be “in.”
- 12B, 35: “Anti-Semitism” should be “anti-Judaism.”
- 14B, 8ff: Add a clause to the sentence beginning, “Wherever we experience the holy, we experience something that concerns us unconditionally because the ground and meaning of our existence ends in Him.”
- 15A, 7: “conceived of” can also be “perceived.”
- 15B, 31: “its” at end of sentence should be “it.”
- 15B, 44: “events” should be “event.”
- 18A, 13: “the first sacrament” can also be rendered “the primal sacrament”
- 15B, 31: “Its” should be “it.”

Editor’s Notes

- The Spring issue will contain papers by Owen Thomas, Christopher Rodkey, Martin Gallagher, Duane Olsen, Anne Marie Reijnen, and others.

- If you presented a paper at the 2004 meeting of the North American Paul Tillich Society, or at the Tillich: Issues in Issues in Theology, Religion, and Culture Group at the AAR, please email your paper to the editor for publication in the *Bulletin*. The author retains the copyright and is free to submit his/her paper to journals.

- If you wish to publish a book notice or book review, or have published a book or article, please let the editor know so the *Bulletin* can announce it.

- If you have found a new publication on Tillich, please let the editor know.

Many thanks.

A Word about Dues

Just a reminder: if you have not paid your 2004 dues yet, please do so at your earliest convenience—$30 for the NAPTS and $40 for the NAPTS and DPTG.

For accounting reasons at Santa Clara University, the dues cycle runs from summer to summer, so dues notices for the year are sent out after the close of the fiscal and academic year on June 30. You will receive notice for 2005 dues with the Summer issue, number 3.

Many thanks to all those who have paid their 2004 dues. It was one of our most responsive years, and the officers of the NAPTS are very grateful for your support.
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